Le contrat de régulation optimale d'un monopole avec deux paramètres d'information privée et d'antisélection (productivité et niveau d'émissions polluantes) est caractérisé. Dans ce contexte de screening bidimension-nel, un aspect d'économie politique est introduit en considérant l'objectif du régulateur comme le résultat d'un processus électoral majoritaire. En fonction du régime politique, deux types de contrats apparaissent : l'un est séparateur, l'autre mélangeant. Leur occurrence dépend de la confrontation des incitations sociales et privées qui résultent de l'arbitrage effectuépar le régulateur entre l'extraction de la rente informationnelle et le gain d'efficacité allocative.

We characterize the optimal regulation contract of a monopoly with two private information parameters of adverse selection (productivity and polluting emissions levels). In this bidimensional screening framework, we introduce a political economy approach, considering that the social objective of the regulator depends on the outcome of a majority vote. Two main types of contracts appear: the first is a separating one, the second is a pooling or bunching one. Their occurrence depends on the conflict between We characterize the optimal regulation contract of a monopoly with two private information parameters of adverse selection (productivity and polluting emissions levels). In this bidimensional screening framework, we introduce a political economy approach, considering that the social objective of the regulator depends on the outcome of a majority vote. Two main types of contracts appear: the first is a separating one, the second is a pooling or bunching one. Their occurrence depends on the conflict between the private and social incentives, which are the result of the regulator's trade-off between informational rents extraction and allocative efficiency.