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Réglementation des négociations collectives, chômage et croissance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Pierre Cahuc
Pierre Cahuc*
Affiliation:
Université Paris I, MAD
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Résumé

Cet article analyse l'impact de la réglementation des négociations collectives sur le chômage et la croissance dans un modèle à générations imbriquées avec concurrence imparfaite. La réglementation est appréhendée à partir de deux critères : le type de variable devant être négocié (salaire, emploi, coefficient de partage du profit, investissement) et la possibilité de renégocier les conventions collectives à des dates non déterminées préalablement. L'aménagement de la possibilité de renégocier à des dates non fixées entraîne toujours une augmentation du chômage et une diminution de la croissance. Augmenter le nombre de variables négociables induit un accroissement du chômage, mais peut avoir des conséquences positives sur la croissance.

Summary

Summary

In this paper are studied the consequences of different wage bargaining rules on employment and growth in an overlapping generations model with imperfect competition. The rules are defined by two characteristics: the type of variable that must be negotiated (wage, employment, profit-share, investment), and the possibility or the impossibility to renegotiate the contracts at any date. Renegotiations raise the unemployment rate and decrease the growth rate. An increase in the number of variables that must be negotiated always increases the unemployment rate, but may have positive effects on the growth rate.

Keywords

820830832820830832
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 60 , Issue 2 , June 1994 , pp. 163 - 195
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1994 

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Footnotes

(*)

Sans engager leur responsabilité, je remercie Pierre Granier, Bertrand Wi-gniolle et André Zylberberg ainsi que deux rapporteurs des Recherches Economiques de Louvain pour leurs remarques.

References

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