Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-gq7q9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-16T18:41:21.909Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Le laboratoire commun de recherche: quelles implications pour une politique de la concurrence?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin ,
Groupe de Recherche sur le Risque, I'Information et la Décision (GRID)  and
Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan
Get access

Résumé

Le laboratoire commun de recherche (Joint Research Lab) est-il préférable à la non-coopération en R&D et sous quelles conditions ? Il est habituel de considérer que le bénéfice social de la coopération en R&D dépend principalement de trois facteurs : (i) le niveau de spillovers, (ii) le degré de différenciation de produit, (iii) le degré de concurrence ex-post sur le marché de la production entre les firmes participant à l'accord.

Dans cet article, nous étudions l'impact de ces trois facteurs sur les efforts d'innovation entrepris dans le cadre d'un laboratoire commun de recherche, sur les quantités produites et les profits des firmes à l'équilibre. Nous montrons que le laboratoire commun de recherche associé à une collusion sur le marché du produit peut améliorer le surplus des producteurs et celui des consommateurs relativement à la concurrence pour certaines valeurs des spillovers et du degré de différenciation des produits. Nous montrons également que cette forme de coopération conduit les firmes à innover davantage en situation de cartel de production qu'en situation concurrentielle.

Summary

Summary

When will a joint research lab be preferred to non-cooperation in R&D? The social benefits of R&D cooperation depend mainly on three factors: (i) the level of spillovers; (ii) the degree of product differentiation, (iii) the degree of ex-post competition in the final market between the R&D partners.

In this article we propose to study the impact of these three factors on the R&D efforts taking place within a joint lab, the quantities produced and the profits earned by the firms at equilibrium. We show that collusion at the production stage can increase the producer's and consumer's surplus vis-à-vis competition if the R&D activity takes place within a common laboratory especially when the spillovers and the degree of product differenciation are small. We show also that full cooperation in R&D with a joint lab and the product market leads to better results in terms of R&D efforts as compared to non-cooperation.

Keywords

R&D spilloversJoint Research Laboratorycompetition policyC720L130D320spilloverslaboratoire commun de recherchepolitique de la concurrenceC720L130D320
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 73 , Issue 1 , 2007 , pp. 77 - 93
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2007 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

FRE 2961 CNRS/ENSAM-Paris, Maison de la recherche de l'ESTP, 30 avenue du Président Wilson, 94230 Cachan, France. Tél : 01 41 98 37 71. [email protected]

**

Département de Sciences Sociales, Bâtiment Cournot, 61 avenue du Président Wilson, 94230 Cachan.

References

Bibliographie

Amir, R. (2000), “Modelling Imperfectly Appropriate R&D via spillovers”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18, pp. 1013–1032.Google Scholar
Amir, R., Narrerup, N., Stepanova, A. et Eguiazarova, E. (2002), “Monopoly versus R&D-integrated duopoly”, The Manchester School, 70, pp.88–100.Google Scholar
Amir, R., Evstigneev, I. et Wooders, J. (2003), “Noncooperative versus Coope¬rative R&D with Endogenous Spillovers Rates”, Games and Economic Behavior, 42, pp. 183–207.Google Scholar
Arrow, K. (1962), “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Ressources to Invention”, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity : Econo¬mic and Social Factors, NBER, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 609–627.Google Scholar
d’Aspremont, C. et Jacquemin, A. (1988), “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers”, American Economic Review, 78, pp. 1133–1137.Google Scholar
d’Aspremont, C. et Jacquemin, A. (1990), “Erratum”, American Economic Review, 80, pp. 641–642.Google Scholar
Brod, A. et Shivakumar, R. (1997), “R&D cooperation and the joint exploi¬tation of R&D”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 30, pp. 673–684.Google Scholar
Cabon-Dhersin, M-L (2003), « Dynamique et robustesse de la coopération inter-firmes en R&D : confiance et réputation », Revue d’Economie In¬dustrielle, 104, pp. 7–22 Google Scholar
Cabon-Dhersin, M-L. et Ramani, S. (2004), “Does Trust Matter for R&D cooperation ? A Game Theoretic Examination”, Theory and Decision, 57, pp. 143–180.Google Scholar
Cabrai, L. (2000), “R&D Cooperation and Product Market Competition”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18, pp. 1033–1047.Google Scholar
Choi, J.P. (1993), “Cooperative R&D with Product Market Competition”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 11, pp. 553–571.Google Scholar
De Fraja, G. et Silipo, D.B. (2002), “Product market competition, R&D and welfare”, Research in Economics, 56, pp. 381–397.Google Scholar
DeBondt, R. et Veugelers, R. (1991), “Strategic Investment with Spillovers”, European Journal of Political Economy, 7, pp. 345–366.Google Scholar
DeBondt, R. et Henriques, I. (1995), “Strategic Investment with Asymétrie Spillovers”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 28, pp. 656–674.Google Scholar
DeBondt, R., Slaets, P. et Cassiman, B. (1992), “The degree of Spillovers and the number of Rivals for Maximum Effective R&D”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 10, pp. 35–54.Google Scholar
Deeds, D. et Hill, C. (1999), “An examination of opportunistic action wi¬thin research alliances : Evidence from the biotechnology industry”, Journal of Business Venturing, 14, pp. 141–163.Google Scholar
Ferhtman, C. et Gandal, N. (1994), “Desadvantageous Semicollusion”, Inter¬national Journal of Industrial Organization, 12, pp. 141–154.Google Scholar
Geroski, P.A. (1993), “Antitrust policy towards co-operative R&D ventures”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 9, pp. 58–71.Google Scholar
Grossman, G. et Shapiro, C. (1987), “Research joint ventures: an antitrust analysis”, Journal of law, Economics and Organization, 2, pp. 340–359.Google Scholar
Hagedoorn, J. (2002), “Inter-firm R&D partnerships : an overview of major trends and patterns since 1960”, Research Policy, 31, pp. 477–492.Google Scholar
Henriques, I. (1990), “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D with spilovers : Comment”, American Economic Review, 80, pp. 638–40.Google Scholar
Jacquemin, A. (1987), « Comportements collusifs et accords en R&D », Re¬vue d’Economie Politique, 1, pp. 1–23.Google Scholar
Kamien, M., Muller, E. et Zang, I. (1992), “Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels”, American Economic Review, 82, pp. 1293–1306.Google Scholar
Katz, M. (1986), “An Analysis of cooperation Research and Development”, Rand Journal of Economics, 17, pp. 527–43.Google Scholar
Katz, M.L. et Ordover, J.A. (1990), “R&D cooperation and competition”, Brooking Papers on Microeconomics, Brooking Institution, Washing¬ton, DC, pp. 137–203.Google Scholar
Kesteloot, K. et Veugelers, R. (1995), “Stable R&D Cooperation with Spillo¬vers”, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 4, pp. 651–672.Google Scholar
Klemperer, P. (1990), “How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?”, Rand Journal of Economics, 21, pp. 113–130.Google Scholar
Kogut, B. (1989), “The stability of Joint-Ventures : Reciprocity and Compe¬titive Rivalry”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 38, pp. 183–198.Google Scholar
Lambertini, L., Poddar, S. et Sasaki, D. (2002), “Research joint ventures, product différenciation, and price collusion », International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20, pp. 829–854.Google Scholar
Leahy, D. et Neary, P. (1997), “Public policy towards R&D in oligopolistic industries”, American Economic Review, 87, pp. 642–662.Google Scholar
Margit, S. (1991), “Incentives for Cooperative and Non-cooperative R&D in Duopoly”, Economics Letters, 37, p. 187–191.Google Scholar
Martin, S. (1993), Public policies towards cooperation in R&D : the European Community, Japan, the United States, Photocopy, European Univer¬sity Institute, May.Google Scholar
Martin, S. (1996), “R&D joint ventures and tacit product market collusion”, European Journal of Political Economy, 11, pp. 733–741.Google Scholar
Matsui, A. (1989), “Consummer-Benefited Cartels under Strategic Capacity Investment Competition”, International Journal of Industrial Orga¬nization, 7, pp. 451–470.Google Scholar
Motta, M. (1992), “Cooperative R&D and Vertical Product Différenciation”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 10, pp. 643–661.Google Scholar
Ordover, J.A. et Willig, R.D. (1985), “Antitrust for high-technology indus¬tries : assessing research joint ventures and mergers”, Journal of Law and Economics, 28, pp. 311–333.Google Scholar
Petit, M.L. et Tolwinski, B. (1999), “R&D cooperation or competition?”, European Economic review, 43, pp. 185–208.Google Scholar
Ruff, L. (1969), “Research and technological progress in a Cournot econo¬my” , Journal of economic Theory, 75, pp. 213–229.Google Scholar
Simpson, D. et Vornortas, N. (1994), “Cournot equilibrium with imperfectly appropriable R&D”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 42, pp. 113–29.Google Scholar
Suzumura, K. (1992), “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in an Oligo¬poly with Spillovers”, American Economic Review, 32, pp. 1307–1320.Google Scholar
Van Wegberg, M. (1995), Can R&D alliances facilitate the formation of a cartel ? The exemple of the European IT industry, Photocopy, Maasstricht, March.Google Scholar
Veugelers, R., (1993), A profile of Companies in Alliances, Leuven, K.U., Working Paper.Google Scholar
Ziss, S., (1994), “Strategic R&D with spillovers, collusion and welfare”, The journal of Industrial Economics, 62, pp. 375–393.Google Scholar