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L’arbitrage entre équité et efficacité en matière d’emploi et de salaires

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Jacques H. Drèze
Jacques H. Drèze*
Affiliation:
Université Catholique de Louvain
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Résumé

L’arbitrage entre équité et efficacité en matière d’emploi et de salaires est abordé de deux manières. D’une part, un modèle simple permet d’analyser les conditions qui rendent la politique de salaire minimum un instrument plus efficace de redistribution que les taxes et les transferts. Une condition nécessaire et suffisante est que la perte de bien-être associée à une hausse des taxes de un franc excède l’élasticité (en valeur absolue) de l’emploi par rapport au salaire net. D’autre part, le modèle est élargi à l’incertitude et aux marchés incomplets. Il est démontré qu’en absence d’un mécanisme adéquat de partage efficient du risque entre tous les agents (en particulier entre les actionnaires et les travailleurs) une forme de rigidité à la baisse des salaires est plus efficace au sens de Pareto.

Summary

Summary

The equity-efficiency trade off associated with wages and employment is considered from two angles. First, a simple model is used to investigate under what conditions minimum wages are a more efficient instrument of redistributive policy than taxes and transfers. A necessary and sufficient condition is that the dead weight loss associated with one franc of taxes exceeds the (absolute value of the) elasticity of employment with respect to net wages. Second, the model is extended to uncertainty and incomplete markets. It is shown that, in the absence of an adequate mechanism bringing about efficient risk-sharing among all agents (in particular among shareholders and workers), a form of downward wage rigidity is Pareto-improving.

Keywords

026821026821
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 55 , Issue 1 , 1989 , pp. 3 - 31
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1989 

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