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De l'optimalité des systèmes d'assurance-chômage : quelques réflexions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

H.R. Sneessens  and
B. Van der Linden
H.R. Sneessens
Affiliation:
Université Catholique de Louvain
B. Van der Linden
Affiliation:
FNRS, Université Catholique de Louvain
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Résumé

La persistance du chômage et les problèmes budgétaires (en particulier en Belgique) rendent inévitable une réévaluation des avantages et inconvénients des systèmes d'assurance-chômage aujourd'hui en vigueur. Les éléments à prendre en compte sont multiples. La gestion efficace des risques de chômage est rendue difficile par toute une série de facteurs, tels que l'asymétrie d'information, le caractère macroéconomique du risque, la segmentation du marché du travail, le pouvoir de marché dont peuvent disposer les entreprises ou les syndicats, les distorsions induites par les mécanismes de financement, etc. L'objectif de cette contribution est de passer en revue les résultats disponibles et de proposer ainsi quelques pistes de réflexions. Ces résultats montrent combien il faut se méfier de raisonnements trop simplistes. Une discussion correcte du bien-fondé d'un système d'assurance-chômage nécessite une approche globale, qui prenne en compte non seulement le montant et les conditions d'octroi des indemnités de chômage, mais aussi le mode de financement de la sécurité sociale et le mode de fonctionnement du marché du travail.

Summary

Summary

In many countries (especially in Belgium) persistent unemployment and budget deficits have motivated a reconsideration of the advantages and disadvantages of existing unemployment insurance schemes. Many aspects have to be taken into account. An efficient allocation of unemployment and wage risks is made difficult by factors such as asymmetric information, undiversifiable macroeconomic risks, labour market segmentation, firms or unions market power, tax distorsions, etc. This paper surveys the available literature on these issues, so as to offer guidelines for this debate. If anything, existing results show that simplistic views are to be avoided. A correct appraisal of the merits of a given unemployment insurance sheme necessitates a global approach that takes into account not only the level of unemployment benefits and the conditions under which they are paid, but also the way social security is financed and the labour market functions.

Keywords

821822915821822915
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 60 , Issue 2 , June 1994 , pp. 129 - 162
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1994 

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Footnotes

(*)

Cet article est la version révisée du rapport pour la Commission 1 du Congrés des Economistes Beiges de langue française, Mons, 26-27 novembre 1992. Nous remercions Bernard Delvaux ainsi que deux lecteurs anonymes pour leurs commentaires et suggestions sur la version préliminaire.

References

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