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Computing price trends in sequential auctions*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Olivier Chanel  and
Stéphanie Vincent
Olivier Chanel
Affiliation:
GREQAM-IDEP, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Stéphanie Vincent
Affiliation:
Danish Transport Research Institute
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Summary

This paper compares various methods used for measuring price trends in sequential auctions and draws on index number theory. Data from wine auctions are used to show that different methods applied to the same data may lead to significantly different conclusions. Moreover the same method can even lead to opposite results depending on the way pairs are selected within the set of similar objects sold sequentially. Finally, the number of identical objects being sold also influences the price trend.

Résumé

Résumé

Cet article compare les différentes méthodes utilisées pour mesurer les tendances de prix dans les enchères séquentielles, en s'appuyant sur la théorie des indices. Des données sur les enchères de vin sont utilisées pour montrer que différentes méthodes appliquées aux mêmes données peuvent conduire à des conclusions significativement différentes. De plus, la même méthode peut conduire à des résultats opposés en fonction du critère de sélection des paires des biens similaires vendus successivement. Enfin, le nombre d'objets identiques vendus influence la tendance des prix.

Keywords

enchèressÈquentiellesaggrÈgation de prixindices de prixC15C43D44sequential auctionsprice aggregationprice indicesC15C43D44
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 70 , Issue 4 , 2004 , pp. 443 - 460
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2004 

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Footnotes

**

Corresponding author: CNRS-GREQAM-IDEP, 2 rue de la CharitĖ, F-13002 Marseilles, France, e-mail: [email protected].

***

Danish Transport Research Institute, Knuth-Winterfeldts AIIÉ, Bygning 116 Vest, DK-2800 Kgs Lyngby, Denmark, e-mail: [email protected].

*

The authors are very grateful to Victor Ginsburgh, Alan Kirman, Michel Lubrano, Peter Lyk-Jensen, Stephen Martin, Costin Protopopescu and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. The usual caveat applies.

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