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Choix d'imposition et interactions spatiales entre collectivités locales : un test sur les départements français

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Matthieu Leprince ,
Sonia Paty  and
Emmanuelle Reulier
Matthieu Leprince
Affiliation:
CREM (UMR CNRS 6211), Université de Rennes 1
Sonia Paty
Affiliation:
MEDEE, IFRESI-CNRS, Université des Sciences et Technologies de Lille
Emmanuelle Reulier
Affiliation:
CREM (UMR CNRS 6211), Université de Rennes 1
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Résumé

L'objectif de cet article est de tester économétriquement l'existence d'interactions spatiales entre les choix d'imposition des départements français de métropole. Pour cela, un modèle de choix fiscal avec autorégression spatiale est spécifié pour estimer la pente de la fonction de meilleure réponse qui relie le taux d'impôt d'un département aux taux votés par les départements voisins pour le même impôt. Nous montrons que pour l'année 1999, l'hypothèse d'interactions fiscales horizontales ne peut être rejetée pour trois des quatre impôts départementaux étudiés, notamment pour la taxe professionnelle qui pèse uniquement sur les entreprises. À l'inverse, la fixation du taux départemental de la taxe d'habitation, qui pèse uniquement sur les ménages, ne semble pas gouvernée par les décisions des départements concurrents. Ces résultats sont compatibles à la fois avec les modèles de concurrence fiscale à la Wildasin (1988) et ceux de concurrence par comparaison à la Besley et Case (1995a).

Summary

Summary

This article provides an empirical test for the existence of spatial tax interactions among French sub-national jurisdictions at the département level. We estimate a spatial model of interdependent tax choices on a 1999 data set of the four main taxes and the usual socio-economic variables. We find evidence of significant horizontal tax interactions for all taxes except for the tax on housing levied on households. Therefore, we conclude that empirical evidence is in favor of the hypothesis that jurisdictions at the département level compete for economic activities, but not for households. We demonstrate that this conclusion is in line either with yardstick competition models à la Besley and Case (1995a) or with tax competition models à la Wildasin (1988).

Keywords

fiscal competitionyardstick competitionlocal taxationH71H73concurrence fiscaleconcurrence par comparaisonimpôts locauxH71H73
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 71 , Issue 1 , 2005 , pp. 67 - 93
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2005 

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Footnotes

(*)

Nous remercions les deux rapporteurs anonymes ainsi que Lars Feld, Alain Guengant, Hakim Hammadou et Sophie Larribeau pour leurs conseils et suggestions. Nous remercions également la direction de la prévision du ministère de l'économie et des finances pour son soutien. Toutefois, nous restons seuls responsables des erreurs éventuelles.

References

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