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Transaction Cost Economics and Contract Duration: An Empirical Analysis of EDF Coal Contracts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Stéphane Saussier
Stéphane Saussier*
Affiliation:
ADIS – Université de Paris XI Sceaux ATOM – Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
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Summary

This paper studies duration of inter-firm contracts in a transaction cost perspective. The aim of the paper is to test the propositions that can be derived from a transaction-cost framework. We built a non-truncated database representing the entire contractual relationships of Electricité de France (EDF) with its coal carriers and coal unloaders over the period 1977–1997. Section I explores factors that can explain the choice of contract duration. Section II describes the relationships between EDF and its suppliers. In Section III, we test and confirm most propositions derived from transaction-cost theory that relate contract duration to transaction characteristics. We believe this study to be the first attempt (1) to confirm transaction cost economics propositions using French data and (2) to endogenize asset specificity level at stake in transactions.

Ce papier étudie la durée des contrats interfirmes au regard de la théorie des coûts de transaction. L’objectif est de tester les propositions qui peuvent être dérivées de ce cadre d’analyse. Pour ce faire, nous avons construit une base de données non tronquée de contrats représentant l’ensemble des relations contractuelles entre Electricité de France (EDF) et ses partenaires intervenant pour le transport et la manutention du charbon sur la période 1977–1997. La section I présente les facteurs à l’origine de la durée des contrats. La section II décrit les relations entre EDF et ses partenaires. Dans la section III, nous testons et confirmons les propositions dérivées de la théorie des coûts de transaction. Nous pensons qu’il s’agit là de la première étude (1) utilisant des données françaises pour tester économétriquement les propositions de la théorie des coûts de transaction et (2) tenant compte du caractère endogène du niveau des actifs spécifiques.

Keywords

L14L92L94L14L92L94
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 65 , Issue 1 , 1999 , pp. 3 - 21
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1999 

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Footnotes

(*)

I am grateful to Eric Brousseau, Scott Masten, Claude Ménard, Oliver Williamson and two anonymous referees, as well as participants at the ATOM, ENSTB, and ADIS seminars where a preliminary draft of this paper was presented. The author has a particular debt towards Jean-Michel Glachant for his indispensable help in the realization of the in-house inquiry necessary to this study. The thoughts expressed in this paper are the author’s, not reflecting the views of EDF. Usual caveats apply. The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Scientific Council of the University of Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne.

References

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