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Structure verticale d'un reseau de distribution de drogues illicites et politique repressive optimale

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Sylvaine Poret
Sylvaine Poret*
Affiliation:
INRA-LORIA & CREST-LEI
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Résumé

Cet article s'attache à donner des fondements théoriques à la structure verticale des réseaux de distribution des drogues illicites, en faisant appel à l'analyse des relations verticales et en intégrant le caractère illégal de cette activité. Il analyse ensuite la manière dont les autorités, par l'intermédiaire des coûts de répression qu'elles imposent aux vendeurs de drogues, peuvent mettre en œuvre dans le cadre d'un équilibre décentralisé l'optimum social. Nous montrons qu'un réseau verticalement séparé, structure optimale de premier rang, très couramment observée sur ce marché, ne peut jamais être mis en œuvre.

Summary

Summary

This paper gives a theoretical base to the vertical structure of the distribution network of illicit drugs by using the analysis of vertical relationships and the illegal character of the drug traffic. The model is then used to show how the regulator, through law enforcement costs imposed on drugs sellers, can implement the optimal structure. We show that the vertically separated network, first best optimal structure, a very often noticed structure on drugs market, can never be implement able.

Keywords

drogues illicitesrelation verticalerépressionK42D23L22illicit drugsvertical relationshiplaw enforcementK42D23L22
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 71 , Issue 4 , 2005 , pp. 391 - 412
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2005 

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Footnotes

*

Je remercie Anne Perrot, Régis Renault, ainsi que les participants aux 18 èmes Journées de Microéconomie Appliquée, pour leurs remarques constructives. Deux rapporteurs anonymes m'ont aidé a améliorer considérablement cet article.

**

INRA-LORIA, 65 boulevard de Brandebourg, 94205 Ivry-sur-Seine cedex - France. E-mail: [email protected]

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