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Stackelberg Duopoly with an Illyrian and Profit-Maximising Firm

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Peter J. Law  and
Geoff Stewart
Peter J. Law
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Warwick
Geoff Stewart
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, The University Newcastle Upon Tyne
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Abstract

Illyrian labour-managed firms may have positively-inclined Cournot reaction functions. Consequently, in a “mixed” duopoly a determinate equilibrium can result in which the profit-maximising firm leads and the labour-managed firm follows. A simple example demonstrates this.

Type
Recensions
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 49 , Issue 2 , June 1983 , pp. 207 - 212
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1983 

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Footnotes

1

Part of this research was undertaken while Geoff Stewart was at the University of Warwick on an SSRC Studentship.

References

Ireland, N.J. & Law, P.J. (1982), The Economics of Labour-Managed Enterprises, Croom-Helm, London.Google Scholar
Miyamoto, Y. (1982), “A Labour-Managed Firm’s Reaction Function Reconsidered”, Warwick Economic Research Paper, No 218.Google Scholar
Moulin, H. (1981), “Deterrence and Co-operation”, European Economic Review, Vol. 15, pp. 179–93.Google Scholar
Vanek, J. (1970), The General Theory of Labour-Managed Market Economies, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.Google Scholar