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L’inflation pourrait-elle repartir en Europe? Expliquer les taux d’intérêt réels et les déficits
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 August 2016
Résumé
Utilisant un modèle théorique à deux périodes, nous essayons de comprendre pourquoi les pays européens ont choisi, dans la période récente, de mener des politiques monétaires restrictives. Nous analysons si l’augmentation de la dette publique qui en résulte ne les conduira pas à choisir, dans le futur, une inflation élevée en contradiction avec l’objectif d’inflation faible qui est affiché.
Summary
We use a two period theoretical model to try to understand why european contries have chosen in the recent period to implement expansionnary fiscal policies and tight monetary policies. We analyse the possibility that the implied increase in public debt will eventually lead to a surge in inflation, in contradiction with the low inflation objective wich is currently assumed.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 60 , Issue 3 , September 1994 , pp. 377 - 402
- Copyright
- Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1994
References
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