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Formation des cartels : concepts et application a la différenciation spatiale

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Eric Giraud-Héraud  and
Hakim Hammoudi
Eric Giraud-Héraud
Affiliation:
INRA-Grignon et Laboratoire d’Économétrie de l’École Polytechnique
Hakim Hammoudi
Affiliation:
THEMA-Université de Cergy, Département d’Économie
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Résumé

Cet article propose d’analyser le lien entre la stabilité d’un cartel et les problèmes qui ont prévalus à sa formation. Pour cela nous reconsidérons, dans un contexte dissymétrique, les concepts de stabilité proposés à l’origine par d’Aspremont, Jacquemin, Gabszewicz et Weymark [1983]. L’hétérogénéité des agents dans l’industrie nous conduit alors à adopter une approche « individu par individu » permettant de dresser une typologie des participants potentiels à la formation du cartel. Nous illustrons cette analyse conceptuelle par une application à un contexte de différenciation spatiale.

Summary

Summary

In this article, we attempt to analyse the relation between the stability of a cartel and the problems that lead to its creation. For this purpose, we consider, in an asymmetric situation, the stability concepts proposed by d’Aspremont, Jacquemin, Gabszewicz and Weymark [1983]. The heterogeneity of agents in the industry leads us to adopt an “agent by agent” approach, which permits us to develop a characterization of the potential participants in a cartel. We illustrate the theoretical analysis with an application in the context of spatial differentiation.

Keywords

L1R1L1R1
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 65 , Issue 1 , 1999 , pp. 63 - 94
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1999 

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