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Chocs de demande et fluctuations du taux de marge: une évaluation du modèle de collusion implicite*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Frédéric Dufourt
Frédéric Dufourt*
Affiliation:
EUREQUA, Universitéde Paris 1
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Résumé

Cet article propose une évaluation quantitative du modèle de collusion implicite de Rotemberg et Woodford (1992), en s’appuyant sur une version totalement spécifiéé qui permet notamment une détermination analytique de l’élasticité du taux de marge face aux variations de la demande agrégée. Dans ce cadre, on montre qu’un tel mécanisme ne parvient pas à générer des effets réels suffisants pour reproduire un certain nombre de faits stylisés importants associés aux chocs de demande, tels que la réaction procyclique de la production, de l’emploi et du salaire réel. Comparé à des mécanismes concurrents de fluctuations des marges évalués dans un cadre analytique similaire, le mécanisme de collusion implicite semble donc avoir des difficultés à s’imposer à lui seul comme une explication dominante de la transmission des chocs de demande à l’activité économique.

Summary

Summary

In this article, I propose a quantitative evaluation of Rotemberg and Woodford’s model of implicit collusion, which is based upon a fully specified version which allows an analytic determination of the markup elasticity with respect to aggregate demand variations. In this framework, it is shown that such a mechanism is unable to generate sufficient real effects to account for some important stylized facts associated to demand shocks, such as the procyclical behavior of output, employment and the real wage in response to public spending variations. Compared with competing mechanisms of markup fluctuations evaluated with the same analytical framework, the mechanism of implicit collusion seems therefore to have difficulties to assert itself as a leading explanation for the transmission of aggregate demand shocks to economic activity.

Keywords

implicit collusionbusiness cyclesaggregate demandE32E32
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 67 , Issue 1 , 2001 , pp. 91 - 111
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2001 

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Footnotes

**

EUREQUA, Université de Paris 1, Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106–112 Bd de I’hôpital, F-75647 Paris cédex 13, France.

*

Je tiens à remercier Antoine d’Autume, Russel Cooper, David Encaoua, Jean-Olivier Hairault, Gilles Le Garrec et Hubert Kempf pour leurs remarques et suggestions qui m’ont permis d’améliorer cet article.

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