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Banque Centrale Européenne, relations stratégiques internationales et stabilisation de la dette

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Charles Figuières
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Abstract:

The adoption of a common central Bank has modified the strategic relationships between fiscal and monetary authorities and raised in a new context the issue of debt stabilization. To study this problem, Van Aarle et al (1997) have proposed a two-country model with a common central bank. In a sense they obtained a neutrality result: the adoption of a common central bank does not modify the evolution of debt if the authorities can commit. This note reexamines this neutrality result by departing from the previous authors on three points: i) externalities are introduced between countries to account for the elasticity of the world interest rate to macro-economic policies, ii) the model features n countries, some of them remaining outside the monetary Union, iii) analytical results are given (many results of Van Aarle et al (1997) were numeric). In this extended context the neutrality result collapses: i) the institutional change introduces an asymmetry between countries, ii) countries inside the monetary union improve their long run welfare, iii) but the outside countries can win or lose under the new institutional setting.

Résumé:

Résumé:

L’adoption d’une Banque centrale européenne a modifié les relations stratégiques entre les autorités fiscale et monétaire et pose sous un jour nouveau la question de la stabilisation de la dette. Pour étudier ce problème, Van Aarle et al (1997) ont proposé un modèle à deux pays avec une Banque centrale commune. Ils obtiennent un résultat de neutralité: le changement institutionnel ne modifie pas l’évolution de la dette si les autorités peuvent s’engager. Cette note réexamine ce résultat de neutralité en s’écartant des auteurs précédents sur trois points: i) des externalités entre les pays sont introduites en raison de l’élasticité du taux d’intérêt mondial aux variables macroéconomiques; ii) le modèle comporte n pays dont certains restent en dehors de l’Union monétaire; iii) les résultats sont analytiques (la plupart des résultats de Van Aarle et al (1997) étaient numériques). Dans ce nouveau contexte le résultat de neutralité s’effrondre: i) une asymétrie apparaît entre les pays; ii) les pays de l’Union améliorent leur bien-être de long terme; iii) en dehors de l’Union les pays peuvent voir leur bien-être s’améliorer ou se dégrader.

Keywords

European Central Bankdebt stabilizationmacroeconomic policiesdynamic gamesC73D92L16Banque Centrale Européennestabilisation de la dettepolitiques macroéconomiquesjeux dynamiquesC73D92L16
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 74 , Issue 2 , 2008 , pp. 167 - 190
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2008 

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Footnotes

*

INRA, UMR LAMETA, 2 place Viala, 34060 Montpellier, France. E-mail: [email protected].

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