1. See M. Parry (1971), 124-26, with reference to Düntzer (1872). Parry's other purpose in describing formulaic systems was to demonstrate that these systems must be traditional.

2. Cf. M. Parry (1971), 141: ‘The truth is that the proofs already given do not allow of any exceptions. They all bear witness to so strong, and so habitual, an indifference in Homer's audience to any possible particularized meaning [of the “ornamental” or “fixed” epithet] that it could not be overcome, no matter how perfectly matched the idea of the epithet and the meaning of the sentence.’ These remarks pertain strictly to the ‘ornamental’ or ‘fixed’ epithet. Parry recognized also the possibility of a ‘particularized’ epithet, but he maintained that an epithet must always be one or the other, and that the distinction, which may be unclear to the modern reader, would have been immediately clear to an ancient audience (M. Parry [1971], 156).

3. See, e.g., Vivante (1982) and Sale (1996), who argue that the epithets are meaningful, albeit used most often without any regard for context; and Austin (1975), 11-80, and Sacks (1987), who argue for various kinds of context-sensitivity. Whallon (1961) seeks to demonstrate for various epithets either a general or contextual relevance. More recently, see the discussion of Friedrich (2007), 83-128.

4. Machacek (1994). See also Visser (1988) and Bakker and Fabbricotti (1991), who stress the flexibility in versification provided by metrically variable ‘peripheral’ elements.

5. Machacek (1994), 329.

6. Machacek (1994), 333.

7. Combellack (1982), 361.

8. M. Parry (1971), 126f. (quotation from 127); for discussion of ‘illogical’ epithets (generally explained by Alexandrian critics in terms of the referent's qualities ‘in general’ [ϰαθόλου] or ‘by nature’ [φύσει] rather than on that particular occasion) see 120-24.

9. For a discussion of ways in which intonation and manipulation of melody and rhythm can contribute to the meaning of performed poetry (in this case, a Bosniac epic song), see Bonifazi and Elmer (2012).

10. Lord (2000 [1960]), 65f.

11. See Foley (1991).

12. The formula occurs only one other time in the Homeric poems: at Il. 10.315 it refers (in the nominative) to the Trojan Dolon, whose encounter with Odysseus and Diomedes I discuss below. West (1988), 156, notes that the asyndetic pairing of compound adjectives with the same initial element is a very ancient poetic device (for similar examples in Homer, see Il. 5.613 and 9.154 [= 9.296]). It is conceivable that Hektor's remark draws attention to a divergence between the way Troy is described in the Iliad and the way the city was described in other traditions.

13. Nagy (1999 [1979]), 329 (§11 n.1). Note that the juxtaposition of this epiklēsis with the epithets ἄναϰτος and δίου nicely illustrates the distinction made by M. Parry (1971), 64, between ‘generic’ and ‘distinctive’ epithets.

14. Note, however, that the phrase is not a true noun-epithet formula, in Parry's sense, since it extends across the verse-boundary. In spite of the fact that the epithet would seem to indicate that the same Areithoos is meant as the one mentioned later in the book by Nestor, ancient critics disputed whether this was chronologically possible. Various solutions were proposed: see the bT scholia at Il. 7.9, the A scholia at Il. 7.10, Porph. ad Il. 7.9, Eust. Il. 2.387.3-6 (van der Valk). There is reason to suspect that Nestor's apparent reference to an established poetic convention evokes an independent Arcadian epic tradition, possibly centered on the figure of Lykourgos. Pausanias mentions a place called Phoizon on the road from Mantineia to Tegea, which, he tells us, locals consider to be the tomb (μνῆμα) of Areithoos (8.11.4; Pausanias clearly has in mind the story as related in the Iliad: cf. 8.4.10). Friedrich Hiller von Gaertringen (RE, s.v. Areithoos) tentatively connected to this monument the Moleia, an Arcadian festival that, according to the scholia to the Argonautica of Apollonius of Rhodes (ad 1.164), was held in commemoration of Lykourgos’ slaying of Ereuthalion (either an error for ‘Areithoos’, as according to Hiller von Gaertringen and Carl Wendel, the editor of the scholia, or possibly a ‘genuine variant’, in the words of Nagy (1999 [1979]), 332, §12 n.14). The wording of the scholion (τιμᾶται δὲ ὁ Λυϰοῦργος παρ’ Ἀρϰάσιν [‘Lykourgos is honored among the Arcadians’]) suggests that Lykourgos was worshipped as a cult hero. In the view of Scodel (2002), 152, Areithoos ‘is surely objectively traditional’. The Moleia would have provided a suitable context for the preservation of lore, possibly including epic poetry, about his death at the hands of Lykourgos.

15. See Nagy (1999 [1979]), 45-49 and passim; see 328-32 for discussion of the tale of Areithoos as an example of this theme. It is in fact precisely the presence of the βίη / μῆτις theme that permits us to understand the reason for the inclusion of the story of Areithoos and Lykourgos, a narrative that may at first appear only loosely connected to the main line of Nestor's argument. The problem faced by the Achaeans when Hektor makes his challenge is that, in the absence of Akhilleus, they have no champion who can best Hektor purely on the basis of βίη. By beginning his speech with Akhilleus’ father, Peleus, whom he imagines grieving over the lack of an answerer to Hektor's challenge, Nestor signals, subtly, that his entire speech is framed in terms of this problem. The tale of Areithoos and Ereuthalion suggests that one way of overcoming invincible βίη is by employing μῆτις. This is in fact precisely the strategy the Achaeans will adopt at the end of the book, when, on Nestor's advice, they construct their defensive wall: Nestor's plan is explicitly characterized as a μῆτις (7.324; cf. Elmer [2013], 116, with n.14). Hektor's challenge, however, is met not by μῆτις but by βίη, as represented by Aias, and the contest ends indecisively. We may compare the role of Aias in Book 15, as analyzed by Petegorsky (1982), 187f.: when a μῆτις to counter Hektor is sought, Aias enters the battle (aided by the μῆτις of Hera's seduction of Zeus), but his success is short-lived; he himself recognizes that ‘the best μῆτις is βίη’, a recognition that points to Akhilleus as the only one capable of opposing Hektor. In glossing μῆτις as ‘cunning intelligence’, I am drawing on Detienne and Vernant (1991).

16. For the etymology, see Chantraine (2009), s.v. λύϰος. The same association between the wolf and μῆτις is detectable in the name of Odysseus’ grandfather, Autolykos (‘lone wolf’), ‘who surpassed all men in trickery and oath-taking [i.e. perjury]’ (Od. 19.395f.), and in the wolf-skin worn by Dolon in the Doloneia (Il. 10.334; I discuss this episode more fully below).

17. Nagy (1999 [1979]), 326-30, with reference to Areithoos. Edwards (1985), 15, notes that ‘Akhilleus’ distinctive epithets are dominated by the notion of swiftness. He is ὠϰύς, ταχύς, ποδάρϰης, πόδας ὠϰύς/ταχύς, and ποδώϰης.’ See also ibid. 19 n.9. In light of this association between speed of foot and βίη, it is striking that the Odysseus of the Odyssey—the poem that spotlights his μῆτις—insists that the footrace is the one form of athletic contest in which he fears being bested (Od. 8.230-33; I thank the anonymous referee for reminding me of this passage). In the Iliad, Odysseus is able to claim victory in a footrace—but only with the help of Athene; this episode, moreover, concludes with a direct comparison between Odysseus and Akhilleus that implies the superiority of the latter in terms of speed (Il. 23.791f.).

18. Edwards (1985), 22. Edwards does not include Lykourgos’ attack in his catalogue of Iliadic λόχοι, although he cites it as an example of the kind of δόλος of which λόχος is a ‘variety’ (19). I find no reason, however, not to count the story as a highly compressed instance of the λόχος theme. For discussions of this theme in the Homeric poems, see Edwards (1985), 15-41, and Dué and Ebbott (2010), 31-87.

19. Opposition between λόχος and πόλεμος: Edwards (1985), 18, and Dué and Ebbott (2010), 34-36; corresponds to the opposition between μῆτις and βίη: Edwards (1985), 39f.

20. Pausanias reports that ‘the road becomes especially narrow’ (ἥ τε ὁδὸς μάλιστα στενὴ γίνεται, 8.11.4) as it passes by the reputed tomb of Areithoos. The phrasing likely indicates that he has the Iliad passage in mind, but the ‘narrow road’ may have featured prominently in other lore surrounding Areithoos.

21. On this passage, see Edwards (1985), 33. It is striking that, as in the case of Areithoos, the victim of the ambush has both a significant name (Ὀρσι-λόχος = ‘he who rouses the λόχος’) and a significant epithet (πόδας ὠϰύς, an epithet Orsilokhos shares with none other than Akhilleus). The meaningfulness of this epithet as applied to Orsilokhos is underscored in the relative clause. (For similar cases in which an epithet is elaborated on by a subsequent relative clause, see Kakridis [1949], 124f.)

22. The story of another ‘mace-man’ is possibly relevant here. One of the brigands killed by Theseus on his way to Athens was a certain Periphetes, who, like Areithoos, was given the epithet ϰορυνήτης because of the iron club he used as a weapon. According to Ps.-Apollodorus, Periphetes was lame (πόδας…ἀσθενεῖς ἔχων, Bibl. 3.217). If this story is considered as a possible multiform of the tale of Lykourgos and Areithoos, it suggests that the motif of speed (or the negation of it) has an established place in the tradition.

23. Richardson (1993), 209. The superiority of μῆτις over βίη is made explicit at 23.315, μήτι τοι δρυτόμος μέγ’ ἀμείνων ἠὲ βίηφι (‘a woodcutter achieves far greater success by μῆτις than by βίη’).

24. Compare 23.515, ϰέρδεσιν, οὔ τι τάχει γε, παραφθάμενος Μενέλαον (‘overtaking Menelaos by cunning, not at all by speed’), with 7.142, τὸν Λυϰόοργος ἔπεφνε δόλῳ, οὔ τι ϰράτεΐ γε (‘Lykourgos slew him by stratagem, not at all by might’).

25. In the Odyssey, both Nestor (3.20) and his son Peisistratos (3.52; cf. 4.204-06) are described as being πεπνυμένος. Discussing the application of the epithet to Antilokhos in Iliad 23, Heath (2001), 136, writes that the ‘treatment of the adjective clearly reveals that the poet is very much aware of the association of πεπνυμένος with the son of Nestor’. Antilokhos’ other epithets in the Iliad are as follows: in the nominative: Νηλήϊος (‘descendant of Neleus’, 23.514), (μεγαθύμου) Νέστορος υἱὸς (‘son of [great-hearted] Nestor’, 5.565, 13.400, 23.541, 23.755; cf. 10.229, 18.16, 23.596), μενεχάρμης (‘steadfast’, 13.396, 15.582, 23.419); in the genitive: Νεστορίδαο (‘son of Nestor’, 23.353), ἀμύμονος (‘blameless’, 23.522); in the dative: δαίφρονι (‘fierce’, 13.418); in the accusative: μεγαθύμου Νέστορος υἱόν (‘son of great-hearted Nestor’, 17.653).

26. Hainsworth (1993), ad Il. 9.57f.

27. See Heath (2001), 133-35.

28. There is a striking similarity between this confirmation of formulaic language and the narrator's gloss on another crucial formula some 50 lines earlier: see Elmer (2013), 194, on Il. 23.539f.

29. Given the heightened awareness of poetic style on display in these passages, it is tempting, especially in the context of the chariot race, to see the ‘narrow road’ as an extension of the traditional metaphor of the ‘chariot of song’ (for a survey of examples, see Nünlist [1998], 255-64), or simply that of the οἶμος ἀοιδῆς, the ‘path of song’ (cf. h. Merc. 451; Pi. O. 9.47, P. 2.96; Call. Jov. 78; see also Nagy (2009), 230-32, on the etymology of οἶμος, of which he reconstructs an original meaning ‘thread, threading’). On such a reading, the στεινωπὸς ὁδός would figure the constraints that confront the poet in a formulaic medium. Lykourgos and Antilokhos, the champions of μῆτις, could accordingly be seen as figures for the poet who is able to navigate these constraints successfully. Callimachus (Aet. fr. 1.25-28), possibly alluding to Il. 23, uses the image of a ‘more narrow road’ to represent his poetic ideal.

30. For the pivotal position of the Embassy in the poem's economy, cf. Wilson (2002), 1: ‘Iliad Book 9 is widely regarded in contemporary Homeric scholarship as the interpretive key to the poem, the linchpin to its plot and tragic vision.’

31. Heiden (2009), 432f., identifies ironies that ‘compromise’ Akhilleus’ claim to transparency, and that seem to him to be emblematic of certain tensions in Homeric criticism. These ironies—Akhilleus’ failure to achieve an ideal transparency—are, to my way of thinking, equally emblematic of tensions inherent in the formulaic style.

32. Scodel (1989), offering this description of Akhilleus’ character (94): ‘Achilles is committed to a straightforward relation between thought and word, word and action.’

33. Cramer (1976), 301f., notes that Thetis addresses the same line to Akhilleus when she asks him to explain the cause of his grief in Book 1 (Il. 1.363), and that she uses an abbreviated version (ἐξαύδα, μὴ ϰεῦθε, 18.74) when she asks him why he is weeping in Book 18 (18.73), after the death of Patroklos. The imperative to speak plainly thus punctuates the narrative at each of the plot's major points of inflection.

34. When ὀνειδίζειν is construed with a relative clause, the clause ordinarily summarizes the past or present actions that are being cited in reproach, as at Il. 2.255f.

35. For blame-speech as a distinct genre that includes ὄνειδος, see Martin (1989), 18 and 68-77. Akhilleus’ prediction of the future brings to mind Adam Parry's remark (à propos of Akhilleus’ declaration, in his great speech in Book 9, that he will say ‘how things will be accomplished’ [ὡς τετελεσμένον ἔσται, Il. 9.310]): ‘Such certainty is godlike’ (A. Parry [1956], 5 n.1).

36. Cf. Whitman (1958), 192, Scodel (1989), 93, Donlan (1993), 166, Cairns (2011), 105-07. See also Elmer (2013), 95, on the way Akhilleus’ remark about the ‘gates of Hades’ echoes the very words omitted by Odysseus. Some commentators interpret Akhilleus’ remark as being directed toward Agamemnon, whose intention to consign him to a subordinate position he senses, notwithstanding Odysseus' omission (cf. Heiden [2009], 433). This is an effective means of accounting for the passage in a psychologically realistic way, but the listener or reader is much more likely to think of Odysseus in connection with this remark, especially if he or she is familiar with the Odyssey. In that poem, Odysseus uses the same figure of speech to condemn liars, even as he lies about his own identity: ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι ϰεῖνος ὁμῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσι / γίγνεται, ὃς πενίῃ εἴϰων ἀπατήλια βάζει (‘As hateful to me as the gates of Hades is the man who, yielding to poverty, utters falsehoods’, Od. 14.156f.; cf. Wilson [2002], 86). Odysseus is even instructed by Agamemnon in the Underworld to ‘say one thing and keep another hidden’ (Od. 11.443).

37. These are not far to seek in the case of the omission of Agamemnon's demand for submission: Akhilleus obviously could not accept any offer of restitution that included such a demand. On Odysseus’ motivation for failing to report Akhilleus’ response to Aias, see Scodel (1989), 96-98.

38. For further discussion of this point, see Elmer (2013), 79-81.

39. Cf. Donlan (1993), 165f.

40. On Agamemnon's offer as a ‘gift-attack’, see Donlan (1993), 164; cf. Cairns (2011), 106f.

41. See the discussion of Dué and Ebbott (2010), 5f., on the famous scholion at the beginning of Book 10 in the Codex Townleianus: φασὶ τὴν ῥαψῳδίαν ὑφ᾽ Ὁμήρου ἰδίᾳ τετάχθαι ϰαὶ μὴ εἶναι μέρος τῆς Ἰλιάδος, ὑπὸ δὲ Πεισιστράτου τετάχθαι εἰς τὴν ποίησιν (‘they say that this rhapsody was composed separately by Homer and was not part of the Iliad, but was introduced into the poem's arrangement by Peisistratos’).

42. See Petegorsky (1982), 203, with reference to Klingner (1940), 339, and Lord (2000 [1960]), 194.

43. For argumentation, see Petegorsky (1982), 175-259, and Dué and Ebbott (2010). Shewan (1911) attempted to refute the arguments leveled against the book by Analytic scholars.

44. See Dué and Ebbott (2010), 69-79.

45. The scholia report two alternative traditions: according to one, Rhesos fought for one day at Troy, and inflicted heavy losses on the Achaeans; according to the other, he would have become invincible (ἀϰαταμάχητος) if he and his horses had been able to drink the water of the Skamandros. For the text of the relevant scholia and discussion, see Dué and Ebbott (2010), 90-106.

46. Cf. Dué and Ebbott (2010), 320; apart from this occurrence and the twenty-two occasions on which it is used of Akhilleus, the word is applied three times to horses (Il. 2.764, 17.614, 23.376) and once to the generic plural ‘horsemen’ (23.262). In the Odyssey, the word is used only twice, both times of Akhilleus (11.471, 538). As Dué and Ebbott note, the epithet cannot but evoke Akhilleus. As in the case of Areithoos, the episode provides a kind of indirect commentary on the absence of Akhilleus (see n.15 above). In pitting Odysseus against an adversary who recalls, in one respect at least, Akhilleus, the narrative ties into the broader theme of rivalry between Odysseus and Akhilleus (on which see Nagy [1999], 42-58). As argued by Petegorsky (1982), 175-254, Book 10 can be interpreted as a response to the challenge issued by Akhilleus in Book 9 at the end of his speech to Odysseus, in which he declares that the Achaeans should ‘devise another, better μῆτις’ (Il. 9.423), since their plan to coopt him has failed. Book 10 demonstrates what can be achieved by Odyssean μῆτις in the absence of Akhilleus.

47. Το παρὲξ ὁδοῦ ἐν νεϰύεσσι / ϰλινθήτην (‘they turned aside from the road, among the corpses’, Il. 10.349f.), compare Ἀντίλοχος δὲ παρατρέψας ἔχε μώνυχας ἵππους / ἐϰτὸς ὁδοῦ, ὀλίγον δὲ παραϰλίνας ἐδίωϰεν (‘turning his horses, Antilokhos drove them off the road; turning aside a little, he pursued [Menelaos]’, 23.423f.). These two passages represent the only collocations of ὁδός and ϰλίνειν in the Iliad.

48. See, for example, Buchan (2004a), 119f. (quoted at Dué and Ebbott [2010], 34 n.5).

49. On the relation between νόστος and νόος, see the essential work of Frame (1978). Diomedes’ mention of blazing fire may itself be an evocation of the Odyssey: the same phrase, πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο, occurs twice in that poem in close thematic connection with Odysseus’ return (Od. 19.39, 20.25), and in his interview with Penelope Odysseus adopts the pseudonym Aithon (‘burning/fiery one’, 19.183). Addressing Patroklos in Book 16, Akhilleus uses the phrase πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο to designate the fire that threatens to deprive the Achaeans of their νόστος (Il. 16.81).

50. On the Odyssean character of Book 10, see Petegorsky (1982), 193-200.

51. I refer here to the following statement from the final epode of Nemean 7: τὸ δ’ ἐμὸν οὔ ποτε φάσει ϰέαρ / ἀτρόποισι Νεοπτόλεμον ἑλϰύσαι / ἔπεσι (‘my heart will never say that I have dragged Neoptolemos about with inflexible words’, 102-04). As David Bouvier pointed out in the discussion following a talk he delivered on the Odyssey's oblique references to questionable aspects of Odysseus’ career (‘How Much Does the Odyssey Know about Odysseus’ Dark Side?: Odysseus’ “Hybris” in Demodokos’ Song’, Harvard University, April 15, 2014), these lines imply that the celebration in song of a Neoptolemos or an Odysseus (discussed by Pindar in lines 20-30, immediately prior to the first mention of Neoptolemos) require πολυτροπία—verbal ‘versatility’—precisely because the deeds attributed to these figures can be ethically problematic. Bouvier's paper stressed the widespread association between Odysseus and Neoptolemos in literature and art, especially with regard to atrocities committed during the sack of Troy.

52. A distinction between Iliadic and Odyssean poetics not unrelated to the one outlined here is suggested by de Jong (1994), who points out that the Odyssey's thematization of hidden, secret thoughts stands in direct contrast to Akhilleus’ ideal of transparency (see esp. 30 and 48).

53. Quotation from Combellack (1982), 361.

54. A.A. Parry (1973).

55. Even Odysseus’ favored technique of exploiting the gap between appearance and reality has a certain kinship with Lykourgos’ victory over the ‘mace-man’. In the apparent contradiction between this epithet and its context there is a similar play between surface and depth: Areithoos seems not to be a ‘mace-man’ at this particular moment, but he is one in a truer and deeper sense.

56. Noting that ἀμύμων, ‘which is used in Homer for 24 heroes, seems to fit 23 of them perfectly well, but raises a question in the case of the twenty-fourth’—Aigisthos—M. Parry (1971), 151, writes: ‘[I]f [Homer] used the epithet ἀμύμονος for Aegisthus with so little thought for the character of that villain, there is no reason to suppose he took any more thought for the character of Odysseus, of Alcinous, or of that Gorgythion who likewise enters the poem only to lose his life at the hands of Teucer.’

57. A.A. Parry (1973). Ebeling (1885), s.v. ἀμύμων, surveys discussions of the problem from antiquity to his contemporaries.

58. A.A. Parry (1973), 148. As she notes on p.156, Parry was anticipated in this conclusion by Hoffmann (1914). Parry rejects the traditional etymology deriving ἀμύμων from μῶμος, finding for this etymology ‘absolutely no convincing evidence in support, and considerable evidence against’ (159); but cf. Chantraine (2009), s.v. ἀμύμων, and Lowenstam (1981), 45.

59. A.A. Parry (1973), 3; on the notion of ‘indifference’, see 161. As pointed out by Combellack (1977), 171, in spite of her acknowledgement that epithets are often used without regard for the specific context, Parry often argues as though some special relevance should be expected.

60. See, e.g., Lowenstam (1981), 44f., Combellack (1982), Heubeck (1987), 38-41.

61. Aigisthos δολόμητις: Od. 1.300, 3.198, 3.250, 3.308, 4.525. The only other figure to receive this epithet is—predictably—Klytaimnestre (11.422). It is significant that Aigisthos is explicitly said to have trapped Agamemnon by means of a λόχος (4.531): he is, in other words, a practitioner of an Odyssean mode of action.

62. There is a striking similarity here to the way that Akhilleus applies the tale of Meleagros to his situation in the Iliad. Phoinix offers the example of Meleagros to Akhilleus in Iliad 9 as a cautionary tale, warning him, as Agamemnon warns Odysseus, not to follow the example. Akhilleus responds by modeling his actions on the tale in an unexpected way: he resolves to refrain from fighting until the battle reaches his own tent. Odysseus similarly applies the lesson by modeling his actions on the paradigm in an unexpected way.

63. Cf. Danek (1998), 481f. Note the emphasis on Penelope's δόλος (‘deceit’) at Od. 24.128 (where she is presented as actively plotting death for the Suitors) and 141, and cf. 11.422 and 439 (with reference to Klytaimnestre's δόλος). To some, Amphimedon's account has suggested the existence of an alternative version of the story, in which Odysseus and Penelope do conspire against the Suitors: see Kirk (1962), 245-47, and Austin (1975), 219 with n.25. Others sense a kind of implicit conspiracy based on Penelope's intuition that the beggar is Odysseus and entered into when Penelope proposes the contest of the bow in Book 19: see Amory (1963) and Austin (1975), 205-38 (esp. 230f.).

64. On this central ethical problem, and the way it is handled obliquely by the poem, see Nagler (1990). At 347, Nagler identifies a hermeneutic principle that seems eminently relevant to my interpretation of Od. 1.29: ‘[O]ddities in the text often draw oblique but unmistakable attention to ethical contradictions.’ (In a footnote, Nagler adds, without further development, that the story of Aigisthos and Agamemnon ‘stands in very much the same oblique relationship’ to the killing of the Suitors as does that of the Companions, which is Nagler's primary object of interest in this article.)

65. The Suitors’ ἀτάσθαλα / ἀτασθαλίαι: Od. 3.207, 16.86, 16.93, 17.588, 18.143, 20.170, 20.370, 21.146, 22.47, 22.317, 22.416, 23.67, 24.282, 24.352, 24.458.

66. On the question of ‘framing’ and its implications for judgments about the ethics of Odysseus’ actions, see now Burgess (2014).

67. For application of the concept of ‘moral luck’ to a variety of Greek literary and philosophical texts, see Nussbaum (2001 [1986]).

68. It is no coincidence that Eurylokhos singles out the Polyphemos episode. As many have noted, the actions of Odysseus and his men in Polyphemos’ cave bear a number of similarities to those of the Suitors on Ithaca. Odysseus is liable to the charge of ἀτασθαλίαι to the extent that his actions converge with those of the Suitors.

69. Cf. Nagler (1990), 346, who calls Eurylokhos’ accusation ‘a bitingly sarcastic revision of the proem's language’. Nagler connects Eurylokhos’ charge to that of Eupeithes, father of Antinoos, at Od. 24.426-39. Eupeithes’ is another of the poem's embedded alternative voices. On Eupeithes and Eurylokhos, see also Burgess (2014), 346f., who comments, ‘The poem in such passages goes out of its way to air anti-Odyssean charges that are essentially irrefutable.’

70. It is notable that the Odyssey assigns to Odysseus’ chief antagonist among the Companions a name (Eury-lokhos, ‘he of the wide λόχος’) that aligns him with Odysseus’ own mode of action. Odysseus’ chief antagonist among the Suitors, Antinoos, is likewise an exponent of λόχος: he proposes and leads the expedition to ambush Telemakhos, which is many times referred to as a λόχος (Od. 4.670 and 847, 13.425, 14.181, etc.).

71. Combellack (1982). In an earlier review of A.A. Parry (1973), Combellack had declared himself in favor of the view that ἀμύμονος Αἰγίσθοιο is simply ‘a lazy use of the formulary style’ (Combellack [1977], 168). In the later article, he readily admits that this explanation ‘may be right’ (Combellack [1982], 364).

72. Fowler (1990). Note that the metrically equivalent epithet ἀνάλϰιδος (‘cowardly’), applied to Aigisthos at Od. 3.310, might easily have been used at 1.29.

73. Combellack (1977).

74. ἀμύμων in reference to Odysseus: Od. 2.225, 14.159, 16.100, 17.156, 19.304, 19.456, 20.209, 20.231, 21.99, 21.325; cf. 9.414 (Odysseus’ μῆτις); 10.50, 16.237 (his θυμός [‘heart’]); and 14.508 (the tale [αἶνος] he recounts for Eumaios). An additional two occurrences, which I have not included in my count of those that refer to Odysseus or his attributes, refer to the physical structure of his house (22.442, 22.459).

75. ἀμύμων is used three times of Akhilleus (Od. 11.470, 11.551, 24.18), Antilokhos (4.187, 11.468, 24.16), and Penelope (13.42, 15.15, 24.194).

76. The repeated lines are: ἴστω νῦν घεὺς πρῶτα θεῶν ξενίη τε τράπεζα / ἱστίη τ’ Ὀδυσῆος ἀμύμονος, ἣν ἀφιϰάνω (‘Let Zeus first of all be witness, and the gods’ table of hospitality, / and the hearth of ἀμύμων Odysseus, to which I have come’). See Od. 14.158f., 17.155f., 19.302f., 20.230f.

77. Athene does not directly contrast the two; she states that Aigisthos deserved his fate, and then laments the situation of Odysseus, accuses Zeus of having forgotten the sacrifices the latter offered at Troy, and asks Zeus why he is angry with him. The question is presumably rhetorical, but the famous paronomasia with which it is posed (τί νύ οἱ τόσον ὠδύσαο [‘why are you now so angry with him’, Od. 1.62], where the verb is clearly meant to be connected to Odysseus’ name) may prompt us to wonder whether Zeus has some reason to be angry. In any case, the most striking thing about Athene's reply is that her remarks leave open the question of whether the charge of ἀτασθαλίαι can be leveled against Odysseus.

78. ‘Blameless Aigisthos’ is only a single example, and so an insufficient basis for constructing a global understanding of Odyssean poetics. I believe, however, that the example is emblematic of an attitude toward language that can be traced throughout the poem. The Odyssey is, after all, a narrative in which direct disclosure can have disastrous consequences, as Odysseus discovers after revealing his identity to Polyphemos. To take another example, one might find in the phrase δῖος ὑφόρβος (‘glorious swineherd’)—another of the ‘illogical’ uses of epithets singled out by Parry ([1971], 151)—an indicator of ethical complexity similar to the one for which I have argued above. The epithet itself is fully validated by the narrative, which shows Eumaios to be valiant and courageous. Its juxtaposition with a marker of low social status, however, unsettles any easy assumptions about the ways in which ethical qualities map on to social class. We might say that it unsettles social class as a semiotic system. Ithaca is a world in which princely men like the Suitors turn out to be worthless, and slaves (and beggars) turn out to be heroes. (For a slightly different interpretation of the epithet, see Thalmann [1998], 90.)