1. Winkler (1990), 43.

2. This is not Aristotle's fourth-century notion of the role of the chorus in tragedy. It is certainly a mid-fifth-century assessment, but I am not concerned, for reasons that will be made clear, with Aristotelian notions of tragedy's objectives. I am effectively rejecting Aristotle's insistence that the chorus perform functionally as another actor who serves plot and meaning (Poetics 1456a25-26). Aristotle argues, ‘Yet what difference is there between singing choral interludes [ἐμβόλιμα] and importing a speech, or a whole episode, from one [drama] to another?’ (1456a30-31). In other words, according to Aristotle, choral stasima become increasingly irrelevant to the plot. I suggest that the effects of choral training on khoreutai remain essential to the plot and success of tragedy.

3. We Philologists 5.35, in Arrowsmith (1990), 353.

4. Gumbrecht (2004), 80-83. Cf. Gumbrecht (2006), 61-69.

5. See Suppes (2012) for problems of formulating and interpreting stimulus-response models. I will be engaging with modelling of far more complex phenomena like memory and action representations, which, needless to say, are even more fraught with methodological and philosophical challenges. See also Suppes (2009).

6. I say that the task of the performers was to perform well rather than to win given, among other things, ‘I'impiego del alea’ in arriving at ‘un pronunciamento risultante da un procedimento deliberatamente complesso’ (Jedrikiewicz [1996], 101; cf. Wilson [2000], 98-102). The gods get to vote too.

7. See Woodruff (2008).

8. On imitative art and personal disposition, mimēsis and ēthos, see Laws 655d. On the interplay of scripted and unscripted character in early philosophical texts, see Collins (2012).

9. Socrates is not speaking here specifically of khoreutai, but generally about an education in music (ἐν μουσιϰῇ τροφή, 401d). Socrates is concerned that young people ‘from earliest childhood (εὐθὺς ἐϰ παίδων) live in a healthy place and be benefited on all sides (ἀπò παντός)’, 401c, which I take to include among other things public khoreia.

10. On likeness (ὁμοιότης) and kinship (συγγενής) between the soul and the Platonic forms, see Phaedo 78b-80c. For more on correspondence between music and disposition, see Woerther (2008).

11. On a related isomorphism—between the outer polis and the inner psyche—and a ‘jointly constituted’ and reciprocal link between the two forms, see Lear (2001).

12. Damon apparently promoted the ideas of formal resemblance and physical impression. The sounds of a continuous melody can be used on the feeble-minded (children and the elderly) to mould or form via a principle of resemblance (δι’ ὁμοιότητος… πλάττουσί) a disposition which is missing or is latent (DK B7 = Aristides Quintilianus, De Musica, 2.14). Music itself is produced by motions of the soul; the motions of a free and noble soul produce free and noble songs and dance, and free and noble songs produce free and noble souls (Athenaeus 628c; cf. Laws Book 2). Socrates' Protagoras claims that sophists' talk of music was merely a disguise (πϱόσχημα) or screen (παϱαπέτασμα) for their true wisdom and purpose, and an ineffective screen at that, for those who are capable citizens (τοὺς δυναμένους) can see right through it; by this account, musical theory is merely a thin epideictic veil for ethical theory (Prot. 316e-317a; cf. Barker [2007], 73f.).

13. Woerther (2008) argues that the mimetic elements of music ‘stimulate the virtues that are conveyed by the imitative harmony, rhythm and speech’ (94). 1 will argue that music does not stimulate the virtues; the formal attributes of music in a certain sense are the virtues.

14. On the physical contact of objects of sense with perception, see the wax tablet model: Theaetetus 190e-196c.

15. This provision of good nurturance may also, for Plato, qualify a truer grace, i.e., a graceful disposition coupled with an account of gracefulness. Young people cannot give an account of fine form in anything (πϱìν λόγον δυνατός εἶναι λαβεῖν, 402a), but they can still acquire a graceful disposition by finding pleasure in and absorbing (ϰαταδεχόμενος, 401e) graceful things.

16. On the consumption of bad ideas, see Prot. 313d-314b.

17. For the use of πϱοσβάλλω (impinge on) in sense perception, see Tht. 154a; cf. Gurd, 122-37 above.

18. The breeze carries and music trains; both ἄγουσι. Cf. Laws 782d.

19. Cf. Laws 653b-c.

20. On the connection between orderly movement and pleasure, see also Tim. 80a-b, Phlb. 31a-32b.

21. Cf. Bobonich (2002), 364f. The Athenian explains that complete virtue is the harmonising (συμϕωνία) of (1) the early training of feelings of pleasure and pain (i.e., paideia, here synonymous with khoreia) and (2) the later acquisition of reason (i.e., the ability to recognise and give an account of this early training, 653b).

22. Xenophon's Socrates asks to be instructed in τὰ σχήματα of the Syracusan dancers in order to ‘improve my health by exercise, to enjoy my food and sleep more… I am eager to give my body a symmetrical development [ἰσόϱϱοπον ποιεῖν] by exercising it in every part’ (Symp. 2.17). Connection between physical fitness and good disposition (pleasure in food and sleep) without rational account. On the unusual nature of this positive example of male dancing, see Hall (2010), 149-51.

23. Woodruff (2001), 8. See Woodruff, 5-22 above, on the cultivation of virtue through sacrament.

24. As we shall see, reperformance and teaching are two acts that require very different kinds of skill and cognitive functions. Reperformance depends on procedural memory while teaching requires semantic memory. Proficient dancers, however, can usually perform both tasks extraordinarily well.

25. Creon: ἀμήχανον δὲ παντòς ἀνδϱòς ἐϰμαθεῖν / ψυχήν τε ϰαì ϕϱόνημα ϰαì γνώμην, πϱìν ἂν / ἀϱχαῖς τε ϰαὶ νόμοισιν ἐντϱιβὴς ϕανῇ (‘It is impossible to know fully any man's character, purpose or judgment, until he has been tested by ruling and law-giving’, Soph. Ant. 175-77). ἐϰμαθεῖν involves in this case the apprehension of a person's essence.

26. Winkler (1990), 56f.

27. Ibid. 59.

28. Wilson (2000), 71. See 71-88 for the practical details of life in the khoregeion.

29. Wilson (2000), 84; Antiphon (6) on the use of lethal drugs to improve the voice; the Athenian on dietary restrictions and voice-training (Laws 665e); and Plutarch on the lavish diet of the chorus that lives in the lap of luxury while undergoing voice-training (εὐώχουν ἐπὶ πολὺν χϱόνον ϕωνασϰουμένους ϰαὶ τϱυϕῶτας, On the Glory of Athens 349b).

30. Wilson (2000), 55-57,72; Aeschines, , Against Timarchus 9–11Google Scholar; Ath. Pol. 56.3.

31. On the grace and beautiful proportionality (ἰσόϱϱοπον) that Socrates sought to develop through the everyday practice of skhēmata, see Xen. Symp. 2.11-27. Gumbrecht (2006), 151f., enumerates our many fascinations with athletic events and athletes: ‘sculpted bodies; suffering in the face of death; grace; tools that enhance the body's potential; embodied forms; [athletic] plays as epiphanies; and good timing’ (see ch. 3). Tragic choral dancers clearly undergo body transformations as a result of intense training; their movements increasingly appear to be far from consciousness (i.e., graceful); they have non-human elements coupled to their bodies, e.g., props, costumes and masks (on which see Meineck [2011]); they train to embody particular formal conventions; and I imagine they may even execute particular routines which serve to refer to and triumph over the routines of other choruses in the current competition or particularly memorable displays of dexterity in past competitions.

32. Wilson (2000), 111; cf. 72, 89-95.

33. I focus here on dance rather than song because the components of dance movement are more easily illustrated. Song and voice also do not belong entirely to the realm of intellect and the semiotic. See Gurd, 122-37 above, on sound. Plato ties together movement of the voice and movement of the body, the latter being a natural and unavoidable consequence of the former (Laws 815d-816a; cf. Peponi [2009], 58f.).

34. Farnell (1999), 345. This history begins, according to Farnell, with the dualism of Platonic metaphysics. Characters of many of the dialogues of Plato clearly mistrust the body and the material world, and seek discipline of the mind. But we have already examined several passages that suggest that discipline of the body may be sufficient for a moral disposition.

35. Mauss (1935); Goffman (1963); Bourdieu (1977).

36. Birdwhistell (1970); Hall (1959, 1966).

37. Farnell (1996), 868.

38. Farnell (1999), 363f.

39. Williams and Farnell (1990), 37.

40. Ibid. 62.

41. Bläsing, Puttke and Schack (2010).

42. Bläsing (2010), 82.

43. Ibid. 82f.

44. Ibid. 83.

45. For a clear illustration of how different kinds of memory contribute to a ballet dancer's training, see Bläsing (2010), 83, who argues that the performance of the piece with excellence—in this case, flawless execution with attention to partners and ‘expression’—is the dancer's primary objective. Attention to partners is a part of semantic memory. ‘Artistic expression’ does not mean that a dancer while performing turns her attention to mimetic aspects; there is no cognitive space for this in the moment of performance. Getting a routine down allows a performer in rehearsal to consider tweaking aspects of her execution of the routine. Spectators may find the ‘artistic expression’ of a dancer remarkable, but the dancer is not analysing her artistry or expression in the moment of performance. The dancer just executes a routine as she has prepared herself to execute it. I am grateful to former professional dancer Stacy Gruenloh for this insight. The performance of the piece depends foremost on procedural memory which requires rehearsing the sequence of chunks and transitions between chunks until the dancer no longer requires conscious recall of the sequence. The conscious recall of semantic and episodic memory may even be detrimental to the performance of the piece.

46. Stevens, Ginsborg and Lester (2009).

47. For more inarticulate awe and reverence, see Woodruff (2001), 48f., 146f., and more below in section 3.

48. Schack (2010), 26.

49. Ibid. 16f.

50. See McDermott (2000). Cf. Barrett (1964), 10-15. For a political reading of the Hippolytus—how aristocratic sophrosyne is ‘made compatible with the vital, energetic temper of imperial Athens’ (75)—see Gregory (1991), ch. 2.

51. Plutarch (Quaestiones Convivales 747A-748E) claims that dance can be demonstrative (deixis), imitative of form or appearance (skhēma), or not mimetic but expressive of some feeling or act or power (phora). Aristotle writes that dancers ‘portray characters and feelings and acts by means of rhythmic movements associated with schemata’ (ϰαὶ γὰϱ οὗτοι διὰ τῶν σχηματιζόμένων ϱ̔υθμῶν μιμοῦνται ϰαὶ ἥθη ϰαὶ πάθη ϰαὶ πράξεις, Poetics 1447a27-28). Lawler (1964) argues effectively that Plutarch's taxonomy of dance was more about his philosophy than it was about recording technical aspects of dance. Deixis, skhēma, and phora are ‘not precise technical terms for the dance…; they are not parallel; and they are not mutually exclusive’ (33; cf. Lawler [1954]).

52. Although a plea to remember choral fellowship (συγχοϱευτής) seems to have been on one occasion enough to end civil war (Kleokritos at Xen. Hellenica 2.4.20-21).

53. Schack (2010), 18-25.

54. Another way to think of this is to ask of the six khoreutai on the red-figure Basel column-krater (BS 415), who are represented in the middle of a stunning, unbelievably synchronised leap—chins up, arms extended, right legs forward, left legs behind, bodies leaning back—what are the assisting functional phases that precede and follow, and allow for, this snapshot of movement? Any difference in the mental movement representations of these dancers (if such a manœuvre were even possible) and the scene would be a mess. I am grateful to Peter Meineck and Desiree Sanchez for bringing this image to my attention in this way.

55. This point need not be reserved for those occasions when dancers perform in unison. In order to achieve its optimal effect on an audience (i.e., visual-kinesthetic correspondence), serial strophic responsion in movement also requires identical mental movement representations in performers. An expert performance in a strophe cannot, for instance, be followed by a novice performance in an antistrophe; experts and novices do not form the same mental movement representations for tasks and sub-tasks, so responsion would be difficult to observe.

56. Wiles (1997), 126-28. On the possibility of a connection between stichomythia and choral responsion, see Gross (1905) and Hancock (1917).

57. Barrett (1964) describes the geographical references to the Eridanos, the Adrias and the western paradise of the Hesperides as all being ‘wildly off’ the same route, the reason being that ‘Eur.'s knowledge of outlying geography was probably completely vague, and in any case the geography here is still (despite the one name Adrias) that of fable and not of fact’ (301). But Barrett does not address the fact that from the stage and orchestra of the Periclean theatre of Dionysos (with an orientation of 346.4°; see Ashby [1998]), all of these locations (including the Atlas Mountains) fall within the 58.6° between northwest and 256.4°. In other words, if the choreography includes a simple gesture to the left (NW or WNW) from the stage, spectators should gather perfectly where the chorus is headed. The Eridanos (A) may be connected through choreography to Atlas and the heavens given both its far-western geography and its sidereal spot near Orion.

58. Wiles (1997) favours (greater) conceptual responsion over metrical responsion between lines 739 and 749 (127 n.23). For arguments for Barthold's emendation, see Barrett (1964), 301-03. The fact is, however, that with the emendation that achieves metrical responsion, there is already significant conceptual responsion around forces (the swelling sea and Zeus) that should elicit reverence. This conceptual symmetry also fits with the overall theme achieved by responsion of the lines preceding and following: generative forces and bounty for which we give thanks.

59. ἀνθαιϱέομαι here must have connotations of ‘braiding’, α ἱϱέω can of course mean to grasp (Od. 4.66) and to pick up (the thread of) a song (ἔνθεν έλών, Od. 8.500).

60. Wiles (1997), 128.

61. Ibid. A point that mixes meaning (rhythmic movement ‘signifies’ erotic passions) with presence (the chorus should move in a rhythmical, pulsing way).

62. The following skhēmata are covered in Lawler (1964): the skopos used either (a) to ‘look off-scene toward a particular place or an approaching person’ or (b) for ‘shielding of the eyes from the radiance of a deity’ (44); a ‘bird’ or ‘flying’ skhēma that often appears in Euripides (46); arms aloft in prayer to or invocation of a deity (43); a hymn-like procession, solemn with gratitude and joy (47); thermaustris or ‘fire-tongs’ characterised by leaping (Athenaeus 14.102), called μανιῶδες (629d-e), ‘violent’ and ‘fiery’ (Photius, Lawler 41); both the dance of the keleustēs that ‘undoubtedly contained a skhēma suggestive of the rhythm of rowing’ (45) and ‘similar “rowing” motions about the head to accompany…wailing’ for an expression of grief (46); skhēmata of a nuptial procession, here a ‘wedding dance in a minor key’ (51); some sort of high jump or kick, perhaps reminiscent of the skelos rhiptein (42) but more solemn; the movement of kybistēsis or ‘tumbling’ which is ‘similar in nature to the thermasulris’ (i.e., μανιῶδες, 42) thereby achieving a ring closure but brings about, like a somersault or roll, a complete rotation of the body. I have added main functional phases for skhēmata for which I do not have evidence but which are easy to imagine as commonplaces, e.g., a water-like flowing, bountiful arms outstretched, arms entwined in ring formation.

63. That is, the sorts of things that Labanotation can describe. If I were better trained in such notation and assured that my readers would find it helpful, I would provide an example in Fig. 2 alongside the procedure string.

64. Winkler (1990), 43.

65. Ibid. 57, 58; cf. Zeitlin (1990), 68. The ‘four principal elements’ that serve as ‘indispensable traits of the theatrical experience’—representation of the body, arrangement of architectural space, plot, and representation of the self as other (71)—largely concern the experience of spectators. Even the final ‘most inclusive’ element of mimesis itself when it comes to the most important part of the experiences and objectives of the khoreutai, as we have seen, ultimately proves to be entirely dispensable. Khoreutai in performance are not consciously representing, impersonating, or deceiving; they are executing a routine. Representation (meaning) has been transformed through training into the presence of bodily configurations and procedures.

66. Gordon (1995), 739.

67. The vector of attention from the chorus to the deliberation or lack of deliberation on the part of characters on stage—that is, attention to the actors' representations or impersonations, and the lessons learned from the decisions of their characters—may at some point receive training, though the degree to which khoreutai and actors trained together in classical drama remains a mystery; see Wilson (2000), 84-86.

68. Again, thanks to Stacy Gruenloh who recalls of some of her best performances not that she excelled at playing a character (see n.46 above)—‘I was not trying to be anything,’ she says—but how it felt to stretch her leg that high or to execute that turn perfectly. Recall that basic action concepts consist of both functional and sensory information—how to perform a movement in a biomechanically efficient way and what it feels like to do so. The sense of accomplishment and satisfaction that comes from performing well in a declarative and conscious way comes after a performance. A dancer does not and cannot dwell on having performed a movement well while performing; anticipation of the next movement drives the routine forward.

69. Winkler (1990).

70. Woodruff (2001), 138.

71. Hursthouse (1999), 123 (her italics).

72. Ibid. 123-31.

73. McDowell (1979/1997), 142. Cf. Dancy (2004).

74. Woodruff (2001) describes how reverence is realised among musicians in an ensemble: ‘(1) The musicians have been engaged, more or less harmoniously, on a project as a group; (2) their project involved ceremony; (3) they have felt themselves largely without ego; (4) they have felt themselves to be part of a clearly defined hierarchy that was painless for all of them; and (5) they have achieved in the end a shared feeling of inarticulate awe’ (48f.). Choral performers develop their capacity for the virtue of reverence with these feelings.

75. Ibid. 146f.

76. McNeill (1995), 2.

77. I am grateful to Richard Rader, Greg Thalmann, Thomas Habinek, Paul Woodruff, Natasha Peponi, Marsh McCall, Peter Meineck, Marcus Folch and Stacy Gruenloh for their guidance, comments and encouragement.