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Cooperative networks games with elastic demands

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 October 2007

Alain Quilliot ,
Fatiha Bendali  and
Jean Mailfert
Alain Quilliot
Affiliation:
Laboratoire LIMOS-CNRS UMR 6158, Université de Clermont II Complexe Scientifique des Cézeaux 63177 Aubière Cedex, France; [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Fatiha Bendali
Affiliation:
Laboratoire LIMOS-CNRS UMR 6158, Université de Clermont II Complexe Scientifique des Cézeaux 63177 Aubière Cedex, France; [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Jean Mailfert
Affiliation:
Laboratoire LIMOS-CNRS UMR 6158, Université de Clermont II Complexe Scientifique des Cézeaux 63177 Aubière Cedex, France; [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
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Abstract

We present here a pricing model which is an extension of the cooperative game concept and which includes a notion of elastic demand. We present some existence results as well as an algorithm, and we conclude by discussing a specific problem related to network pricing.

Keywords

Cooperative gamespricingfixed pointnetwork design
Type
Research Article
Information
RAIRO - Operations Research , Volume 41 , Issue 4 , October 2007 , pp. 345 - 360
Copyright
© EDP Sciences, ROADEF, SMAI, 2007

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