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The Popper/Kuhn debate: truth and two faces of relativism1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 July 2009

M. A. Notturno
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Synopsis

This paper argues: (1) that analysis of the issues upon which Popper and Kuhn have been thought to differ – the possibility of conclusive falsification, the incommensurability of theories, and the existence of normal science – reveals no appreciable difference at all; (2) that the basic point of disagreement concerns the role of truth in scientific inquiry, i.e. whether or not truth should be considered the regulative ideal of science; (3) that confusion concerning these issues results from a paradigm shift in epistemology; and (4) that Popper's epistemology proves more attractive than Kuhn's for unification in psychology.

Type
Research Article
Information
Psychological Medicine , Volume 14 , Issue 2 , May 1984 , pp. 273 - 289
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1984

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Footnotes

1

This is a revised version of a paper first presented in colloquium before the Department of Psychiatry at the Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions, Baltimore, Maryland, USA.

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