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Animals, humans and Martians: the concept of persons
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 January 2018
Abstract
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This paper examines the concept of the person as distinct from the concept of the human being. It argues that the criteria which some contemporary philosophers propose for making this distinction are likely to have adverse effects for the moral status of people with learning disability and psychiatric disorders respectively.
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- Original Papers
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- This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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- Copyright © Royal College of Psychiatrists, 1995
References
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