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Which Universal?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Philip L. Peterson
Philip L. Peterson*
Affiliation:
Syracuse University
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D.A. Armstrong’s account (1983, intimately influenced by Tooley 1977 and Swoyer 1982) of natural laws is that they are relations between universals. Armstrong doesn’t simply hold that laws are some relationships or other between universals. He also holds that they are first-order universals themselves (1983, pp. 89-90). Each ordinary law-say, causal law-is numerically identical to some first-order universal. This is a striking, seemingly incredible hypothesis. What is Armstrong thinking of when he says (1983, p. 90):

I propose that the state of affairs, the law, N(F,G), is a dyadic universal, that is, a relation, holding between states of affairs. Suppose that a particular object, a, is F, and so, because of the law N(F,G), it, a, is also G. This state of affairs, an instantiation of the law, has the form Rab, where R = N(F,G), a = a’s being F, and b, = b’s being G:

(N(F,G))(a's being F, b's being G).

Type
Part I. Confirmation and Scientific Laws
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1988 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1988 , 1988 , pp. 24 - 30
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1988

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