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Theoretical Analyticity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

John A. Winnie
John A. Winnie*
Affiliation:
University of Hawaii
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Extract

The logical analysis of the structure of scientific theory is a task which is central to any comprehensive philosophy of science, and in this sphere no philosopher has contributed more incisively than Rudolf Carnap. The clarity and rigor of his analyses have always made them apt candidates for fruitful discussion and criticism, and Professor Carnap's last proposal dealing with the problem of theoretical analyticity is, I hope to show, no exception to this rule. For my aim here is to take advantage of the rigor of Carnap's formulation by developing its consequences in some detail. The results which emerge from such a development are then employed to overcome some of the more weighty objections against the possibility of drawing an analytic-synthetic distinction for theoretical systems.

Type
Contributed Papers
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1970 , 1970 , pp. 289 - 305
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1970

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References

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