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The Structure, Growth and Application of Scientific Knowledge: Reflections on Relevance and the Future of Philosophy of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Ronald N. Giere
Ronald N. Giere*
Affiliation:
Indiana University
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Extract

I would like to make it clear at the outset that this paper is not about a problem in the philosophy of science; it is about the philosophy of science itself. Furthermore, the discussion will not be confined to developments internal to philosophy of science but will include considerations of external factors and their possible relations to the philosophy of science. The justification for this departure from standard practice is simply that the issues to be discussed seem to be enough on many peoples’ minds to justify bringing them out into the public arena.

There is no need to dwell on the all too familiar external factors labeled by well-known catch phrases such as ‘over-population’, ‘pollution’, ‘violence’, ‘runaway technology’, ‘social disintegration’, etc., etc. Although one may debate their precise nature and speculate on their eventual relative significance, the seriousness of these problems, especially in conjunction, can hardly be doubted.

Type
Contributed Papers
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1970 , 1970 , pp. 539 - 551
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1970

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References

Notes

1 Achinstein, P., Concepts of Science, Baltimore, Md, Johns Hopkins Press, 1968Google Scholar. Brody, B., Readings in the Philosophy of Science, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970Google Scholar.

2 I assume throughout that the logical-mathematical structure of a set of statements includes semantical as well as syntactical relations.

3 Lakatos would deny that he is contributing to heuristics. Nevertheless, his latest published writings can be viewed as containing general heuristic maxims. See ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs’ in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (ed. by Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Note that the term ‘application’ is used in two distinct ways. One is to distinguish pure (or ‘meta’) studies from applied (or ‘substantive’) studies. The other is to distinguish the structure and acquisition of knowledge from the application of knowledge. Thus there can be applied studies of the application of knowledge. One might get by fairly well and perhaps avoid some confusion by relying on the terms ‘meta’ and ‘substantive’ to make the former distinction.

5 Törnebohm, H., Science of Science, Institute for the Theory of Science, Gothenburg, 1969Google Scholar. Agassi, J., ‘The Confusion Between Science and Technology in the Standard Philosophies of Science’, Technology and Culture 7 (1966) 348-66CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Bunge, M., Scientific Research, Springer, New York, 1967CrossRefGoogle Scholar. These authors have of course been concerned with the methodology of science as well. There are also vast amounts of relevant literature outside, or at best at the periphery, of the philosophy of science. Most philosophers of science have at least heard of some of the work of C. West Churchman in Operations Research and related areas. Some of this literature may provide a good starting point for more philosophical studies in the methodology of science and technology.

8 For an extended discussion and further references see Stommel, H., ‘Future Prospects for Physical Oceanography’, Science 168 (1970) 1531-37CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed. The choice of a ‘non-fundamental’ science for this example is deliberate. It seems likely that methodological studies will be more fruitful, at least initially, in such sciences than in basic areas of physics.

7 There are those who would claim that, at the present, anything which contributes to the solution of our many external problems merely prolongs the survival of an evil political system, i.e., the U.S. Government. That major changes in our society are necessary goes without saying, but I do not believe that our present system is totally evil and that constructive change is impossible without revolution. Thus in what follows I simply assume that much good can be accomplished within the present political framework. My greatest fear is that those who (irrationally) think otherwise will eventually succeed in making their present claims come true.