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Some Complexities of Experimental Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Margaret Morrison
Margaret Morrison*
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Extract

Traditional accounts of the relationship between experimental evidence and hypotheses have been challenged in the recent work of Hacking (1983), Galison (1987), and Franklin (1986,1990). These authors have pointed to the independent aspects of the experimental tradition and forced us to rethink the view that experiment is simply the handmaid of theory. As a result we have come to recognize the tremendous intricacies involved in theory testing and experimentation and have come to appreciate the various ways experiment shapes scientific practice.

In what follows I want to extend this discussion by taking a closer look at the way in which theories are supported by empirical evidence. In addition to the traditional testing model the method of deduction from phenomena, made famous by Newton, is also thought to furnish experimental evidence insofar as the theory itself is supposedly deduced from empirical data.

Type
Part II. Experimentation
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1992 , 1992 , pp. 49 - 62
Copyright
Copyright © 1992 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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