Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-fbnjt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-10-28T15:27:12.308Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Science and Play

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Michael Goldman
Michael Goldman*
Affiliation:
Miami University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Many philosophers interested in problems of scientific progress—what it is and whether it is possible—have in recent years, and with good reason, focused on the challenges directed by Kuhn (1962) and Feyerabend (1975) to the traditional belief in progress by accretion. I have argued (in response to Feyerabend's proliferation theory) that the proper locus for a solution to these problems must be the social (or what I prefer to call the “material”) conditions in which proposed competing theories must exist (Goldman 1980)). Recently, Gonzalo Munévar has proposed similar criteria in his book Radical Knowledge (1981). Our approaches have much in common. Most importantly they eschew the wholly “intellectual” criteria offered by almost all philosophers; that is, criteria which focus entirely on a theory's ability to solve problems arising only in thought (whether they be called ‘conceptual’ or ‘empirical’ problems).

Type
Part IX. Philosophy of Science, past and Future: Metaphor and Play
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1982 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1982 , 1982 , pp. 406 - 414
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1982

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

1

This paper was written while I was studying under a National Endowment for the Humanities Residential Fellowship for College Teachers. I am grateful to my colleagues in that program for their suggestions, and to Peter Schuller, my colleague at Miami University, with whom I have discussed these issues.

References

Berlyne, D.E. (1969). “Laughter, Humor, and Play.” In Handbook of Social Psychology, Volume III. Edited by Lindzey, Gardner and Aronson, Elliot. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. Pages 795–852.Google Scholar
Feyerabend, Paul. (1975). Against Method. London: New Left Books.Google Scholar
Goldman, Michael. (1980). “Against Feyerabend: The Meaning of Progress in Science.” In Research in Philosophy and Technology. Volume III. Edited by Durbin, Paul. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press. Pages 28–38.Google Scholar
Kuhn, Thomas. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Laudan, Larry. (1977). Progress and Its Problems. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Lorenz, Konrad. (1950). “Ganzheit und Teil in der tierischen und menschlichen Gemeinschaft.” Studium Generale 9: 455–199. (As reprinted as “Part and Parcel in Animal and Human Societies: A Methodological Discussion.” (trans.) Robert Martin. In Loren. (1971). Pages 115-195.)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lorenz, Konrad. (1954). “Psychologie und Stammesgeschichte.” In Die Evolution der Organismen. 2nd ed. Edited by G. Heberer. Jena: G. Fischer. Pages 131-172. (As reprinted as “Psychology and Phylogeny.” (trans.) Robert Martin. In Loren. (1971). Pages 196-245.)Google Scholar
Lorenz, Konra. (1971). Studies in Animal Behavior, Volume II Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Munévar, Gonzalo. (1981). Radical Knowledge. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.Google Scholar
Scriven, Michael. (1972). “The Concept of Comprehension: From Semantics to Software.” In Language Comprehension and the Acquisition of Knowledge. Edited by Freedle, Roy O. and Carroll, John B.. Washington: V.H. Winston and Sons. Pages 31–39.Google Scholar
Toulmin, Stephen. (1972). Human Understanding. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar