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Rationality and the Social Sciences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

James H. Moor
James H. Moor*
Affiliation:
Dartmouth College
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Extract

In this paper I will propose and defend a view of rationality which bears on three important issues in the philosophy of the social sciences. First, there is the issue of the nature of the principle of rationality in the social sciences. When the principle of rationality is formulated as an interesting empirical generalization, it seems false; but when the principle of rationality is formulated in a way which is clearly defensible and true, it seems trivially tautologous ([A],pp. 172-178). Secondly, there is the issue of the criteria for a rational action. When the criteria for a rational action are made relative to a culture, there is an implausibly large number of standards for judging rationality; but when the criteria for a rational action are not made relative to a culture, there is an implausibly small number of rational actions ([5], pp. 94-111).

Type
Part I. Philosophy of Social Science
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1976 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1976 , 1976 , pp. 2 - 11
Copyright
Copyright © 1976 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

In developing this paper I am very indebted to conversations with Bernard Gert.

References

Gert, Bernard. The Moral Rules. New York: Harper & Row, Inc., 1973.Google Scholar
Hempel, Carl. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: The Free Press, 1965.Google Scholar
Lukes, Steven. “Some Problems about Rationality.” In Rationality. Edited by Wilson, Bryan. New York: Harper & Row, Inc., 1971. Pages 194-213.Google Scholar
Watkins, John. “Imperfect Rationality.” In Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences. Edited by Borger, Robert and Cioffi, Frank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. Pages 167-217.Google Scholar
Winch, Peter. “Understanding a Primitive Society.” In Rationality. Edited by Wilson, Bryan. New York: Harper & Row, Inc., 1971. Pages 78-111.Google Scholar