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Rational Conceptual Change

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

William L. Harper
William L. Harper*
Affiliation:
The University of Western Ontario
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Extract

One of the salient features of Carnap's systems of inductive logic is a conditionalization learning model, which also plays a fundamental role in the orthodox Bayesian account of rationality. This learning model does not allow for revision of previously accepted evidence. It is, therefore, not adequate to represent all rational learning by an agent who accepts corrigible propositions as evidence. Recently I used a generalization of the concept of conditional belief to extend the model so that rational revision of previously accepted evidence can be accommodated. My generalization of conditional belief carries with it a natural way of representing an agent's conceptual framework. In this paper I exploit this representation to produce learning models that can accommodate rational conceptual change.

The idea of conceptual change has received considerable attention in recent work of philosophers of science. The following quotation from Hilary Putnam is instructive.

Type
Part VIII. Systems of Inductive Logic Where Generalizations Can Receive Non-Zero Probabilities
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1976 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1976 , 1976 , pp. 462 - 494
Copyright
Copyright © 1977 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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