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Procedural Representation in Michael Faraday's Scientific Thought
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2022
Extract
Michael Faraday (1791-1867) was a productive, historically significant, figure who has served as the subject of several recent attempts to construct a cognitive model of the nature of scientific thinking (Gooding, 1985; Nersessian, 1984; Tweney, 1985a; in press). Of particular interest in the present context is the relation of such an analysis to the broader issue of the role of cognitive accounts in the philosophy of science. In accord with Giere's call for a ‘cognitive realism,’ I believe there are substantial philosophical implications that stem from one overriding characteristic of Faraday's work, namely his reliance on procedural ways of thinking. By procedural, I mean thinking which is rooted in specific activities whether concrete or abstract. As will become clear, my use of this term places me at odds with those psychologists, like Piaget, who regard concrete thought as different in kind and less powerful than formal thought. While it is indeed different in kind, it is not less powerful.
- Type
- Part IX. Epistemology
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © 1987 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
Grateful acknowledgement is made to the archival staffs of the Institution of Electrical Engineers, London, England, and to the Royal Institution of Great Britain, London, England, for access to unpublished materials. The research described was supported in part by grants from the Faculty Research Committee, Bowling Green State University.
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