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Probability Kinematics and Causality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 June 2023

Richard Jeffrey
Richard Jeffrey*
Affiliation:
Princeton University
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Brian Skynns 's Dynamics of Rational Deliberation (1990) answers questions I have puzzled over for thirty years, and suggests fresh approaches to other questions. Here I want to explore an answer, in Skynns's dynamic terms, to an old question on my agenda concerning Humean (or Kantian, or pragmatic) probabilistic accounts of causal talk:

What features of your judgmental probabilities show that you view truth of one proposition as promoting truth of another, rather than as being promoted by truth of that other, or as being promoted by truth of some third proposition which also promotes truth of the other?

Type
Part XI. The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1992 , 1993 , pp. 365 - 373
Copyright
Copyright © 1993 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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