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Local Incommensurability and Communicablity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Xiang Chen
Xiang Chen*
Affiliation:
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
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One of the most controversial ideas in recent philosophy of science is the incommensurability of scientific theories. For Kuhn, the claim that two theories are incommensurable is the claim that there is no common language within which both theories could be fully expressed (Kuhn 1977, p. 301). In others words, two theories are incommensurable if and only if they are articulated in languages that are not mutually translatable or communicable without loss. This type of incommensurability, according to Kuhn, is the result of changes in worldview. The proponents of different paradigms practice their researches in different worlds (Kuhn 1970, p. 150). They may have different classifications of objects in the world due to their different cultures. For example, the astronomers who belonged to Ptolemy’s paradigm grouped the sun, moon, and Mars into the same set, while the astronomers who belonged to Copernicus’s paradigm classified them into three different categories.

Type
Part II. Discovery and Change
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1990 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1990 , 1990 , pp. 67 - 76
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1990

Footnotes

1

Earlier version of this paper was prepared for Professor Peter Barker’s seminar on “Psychology of Science” in 1989. I am grateful to Professor Barker for his comments and criticisms.

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