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Informal Aspects of Theory Reduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

David L. Hull
David L. Hull*
Affiliation:
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
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Extract

The issues which separate the members of this symposium concern the nature of reduction and scientific theories. However, these issues involve primarily informal aspects of theory reduction. But more than this, they concern the nature of philosophy of science itself.

Kenneth Schaffner (1967) has set out what he terms a general reduction paradigm, a development of earlier efforts by such philosophers as Ernest Nagel, J. H. Woodger, and Carl Hempel. This model, according to Schaffner, “represents an ideal standard for accomplished reductions, and does not characterize the research programmes of molecular biologists.” Following the lead of his predecessors, Schaffner does not intend for his model of theory reduction to characterize the ongoing process of science (Wimsatt’s rational) but an abstract, formal relation between atemporal rational reconstructions of scientific theories (Wimsatt’s rational).

Type
Symposium: History and Philosophy of Biology
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1974 , 1974 , pp. 653 - 670
Copyright
Copyright © 1976 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

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References

Bibiliography

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