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In Praise of Truth and Substantive Rationality: Comments on Laudan’s Progress and Its Problems
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 January 2023
Extract
Like most philosophers, Laudan [7] believes that by and large science makes cognitive progress and that the development of science is more or less rational. His book deals with two major problems:
(a) In what sense does science progress? What is scientific progress?
(b) Wherein lies the rationality of the growth of science? What is scientific rationality?
In the main body of this paper, I first summarize and evaluate some of Laudan’s criticisms of his predecessors. Then I outline and criticize Laudan’s own theory of scientific progress and scientific rationality. In the Postscript I sketch my own views concerning the issue of changes in the canons of scientific rationality and the problem of using history to evaluate normative theories of scientific rationality.
- Type
- Part XII. Laudan’s Progress and Its Problems
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © 1981 Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
I would like to acknowledge Alberto Coffa’s many helpful comments and probing questions. The Postcript of this paper is a direct result of discussions with History and Philosophy of Science students in my seminar on Theories of Scientific Progress, Spring 1979.