Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-4rdpn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-10-28T09:28:42.595Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Direction of Causation: Ramsey's Ultimate Contingency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 June 2023

Huw Price
Huw Price*
Affiliation:
The University of Sydney
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

Our present concern originales with two uncontroversial observations about causation: the causal relation is asymmetric, so that if Ais a cause of B then B is not a cause of A; and effects never (or almost never) occur before their causes. Uncontroversial as they may be, these features of causation are far from unproblematic. A philosophical theory of causation thus has these two non-trivial tasks, among others: to explicate the difference between cause and effect-to reveal the true content of the “arrow” of causation, so to speak-and to explain why the arrow of causation is so well aligned with the arrow of time.

Type
Part VIII. Statistical Asymmetries and the Direction of Causation
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1992 , 1993 , pp. 253 - 267
Copyright
Copyright © 1993 by the Philosophy of Science Association

References

Arntzenius, F. (1990), “Physics and Common Causes”, Synthese 82: 77-96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ehring, D. (1982), “Causal Asymmetry”, The Journal of Philosophy 79: 761-74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ehring, D. ( 1987), “Papineau on Causa! Asymmetry”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37: 81-7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horwich, P. (1987), Asymmetries in Time. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. (1979), “Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow”, Nôus 13: 455-76.Google Scholar
Menzies, P. & Price, H. (forthcoming), “Causation as a Secondary Quality”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.Google Scholar
Papineau, D. (1985), “Causal Asymmetry”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36: 273-89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Popper, K. (1956), “The Arrow of Time”, Nature 177: 538CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Price, H. (1986), “Against Causal Decision Theory”, Synthese 67: 195-212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Price, H. (1991a), Article review of K. G. & J. S. Denbigh, Emropy in Relation to Incomplete Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, 1985) and H. D. Zeh, The Physical Basis of the Direction of Time (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1989), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42: 111-144.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Price, H. (1991b), “Agency and Probabilistic Causality”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42: 157-76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Price, H. (1991c), “The Asymmetry of Radiation: Reinterpreting the Wheeler-Feynman Argument”, Foundations of Physics 21 : 959-75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Price, H. (1992), “Agency and Causa! Asymmetry”, Mind 101: 501-20. 267Google Scholar
Price, H. (forthcoming), “Neglected Route to Realism About Quantum Mechanics”, Mind.Google Scholar
Ramsey, F. P. (1978), “General Propositions and Causality”, in Foundations: Essays in Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics and Economics, D.H. Mellor (ed.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 133-51.Google Scholar
Reichenbach, H. (1956), The Direction of Time. Berkeley: University of California Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sober, E. (1988a), Reconstructing the Past: Parsimony, Phylogeny and Inference. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT Press.Google Scholar
Price, H. (1988b), “The Principle of the Common Cause”, in Probability and Causality: Essays in Honor of Wesley Salmon, J.H. Fetzer (ed.). Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 211-28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Taylor, R. (1966), Action and Purpose, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
Zeh, H. D. (1989), The Physical Basis of the Direction ofTime, Berlin: Springer-Verlag.CrossRefGoogle Scholar