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Comments on Maddy and Tymoczko

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Pau Benacerraf
Pau Benacerraf*
Affiliation:
Princeton University
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Type
Part XI. New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1984 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1984 , 1984 , pp. 476 - 485
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

Comments on (Maddy 1985) and (Tymoczko 1985), constituting, along with comments by George Boolos, a Symposium entitled “New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics”, Philosophy of Science Association Meetings, Chicago, October 1984. I am grateful to Paul Boghossian for a number of discussions of Kripke's Wittgenstein. He is blameless for the remarks I make here.

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