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Bayesian Inference with Indeterminate Probabilities
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2022
Extract
There is an increasing recognition by friends of personal probability that the standard systems of personal probability do not provide a fully adequate basis for the theories of scientific inference and rational decision making. This recognition has methodological and formal components. On the methodological side, Jeffrey [8] and Spielman [16], [17] have suggested that personal probabilities should be interpreted as judgments about the credibility of propositions, i.e., as appraisals of the degrees of confidence that are warranted by the information available to the appraiser. The idea behind this interpretation is that there are criteria for appraising degrees of confidence as rational, plausible, silly or unwarranted. They have not been canonized, with the exception of the traditional informal fallacies of insufficient evidence, and if they were, would be highly vague and subject to revision as knowledge advances.
- Type
- Part VI. Induction and Probability
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- Copyright © 1976 by the Philosophy of Science Association