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The Background to the Forefront: A Response to Levi and Shapere

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Joh Worrall*
Affiliation:
London School of Economics

Extract

The papers by Isaac Levi and by Dudley Shapere, despite their many differences, share a common theme. This is the idea that science in a certain sense builds upon itself, that some of its assertions, having become firmly established, play important roles in the further development of science. Established science not only guides practical action, it also constrains possible conjectures, guides the construction of more extended and related theories, and even guides the construction of their eventual successors (though this last needs very careful handling). This basic idea is surely correct; but I have many disagreements with the particular (and different) ways that the basic idea is developed by Isaac Levi and Dudley Shapere. I shall therefore first, outline very roughly the sort of development of this basic idea that I would advocate.

Type
Part XVI. Reason and Scientific Change
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

Glymour, Clark (1980). Theory and Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
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Popper, Karl (1950). The Open Society and Its Enemies. 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Shapere, Dudley “Objectivity, Rationality, and Scientific Change.” In PSA 1984, Volume 2. Edited by Asquith, P.D and Kitcher, P. East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association. Pages 637-663.Google Scholar
Horrall, John (1982a). “Broken Bootstraps.” Erkenntnis 18: 105-130.Google Scholar
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