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Ayer and Russell on Naive Realism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2022
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In his book, Russell and Moore: The Analytic Heritage, A. J. Ayer takes issue with Russell's defense of scientific realism and his rejection of naive realism. ([1], pp. 126f.) Russell's position is succinctly stated in An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth ([3], p. 13) as follows:
Scientific scripture, in its most canonical form is embodied in physics ( including physiology). Physics assures us that the occurrences which we call ‘perceiving objects’ are at the end of a long causal chain which starts from the objects, and are not likely to resemble the objects except, at best, in certain very abstract ways. We all start from ‘naive realism, i. e. , the doctrine that things are what they seem. We think that grass is green, that stones are hard, and that snow is cold.
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- Part V. Epistemological Foundations of Science
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- Copyright © 1976 by the Philosophy of Science Association
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