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The Ambiguous Role of Experience in Cartesian Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Desmond M. Clarke
Desmond M. Clarke*
Affiliation:
University College, Cork, Ireland
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Extract

There is something methodologically amiss in Cartesian science. Apart from some recent commentators ([1], [12], [13]), the source of Descartes’ problems is usually located in a Rationalist preference for the evidentiary force of “reason” rather than “experience” in the construction and testing of scientific hypotheses. In other words, Descartes’ metaphysics and theory of knowledge are said to imply a scientific methodology which precludes, or greatly diminishes, the decisive role of empirical evidence in the development of a viable science of nature ([2]; [14], p. 384-5; [15]. P. 15; [16]).

I wish to agree in general with the recognition of some kind of miscarriage in Descartes’ methodology, but I locate the source of his scientific weakness elsewhere. I argue that there is no unusual or especially significant opposition between reason and experience in Cartesian methodology - nor do Descartes’ problems derive primarily from his. metaphysics.

Type
Part V. Epistemological Foundations of Science
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1976 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1976 , 1976 , pp. 150 - 164
Copyright
Copyright © 1976 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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