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On the Radical Incompleteness of the Manifest Image

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Bas C. van Fraassen
Bas C. van Fraassen*
Affiliation:
University of Toronto and University of Southern California
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Extract

In my discussion of Sellars I have said as little as possible about my own position. But I think I should just mention that the descriptions of instrumentalists by Professors Sellars and Cornman do not fit me. That is why I would prefer the term “anti-realist”.

To my mind, theoretical entities are fictions. To explain this, let me draw an analogy. Suppose someone writes a short story about a quarrel between a man and a cat. There may be or have been in the world, somewhere, a man and a cat who quarrelled, and who are by and large just like the characters in the story. This possibility is quite irrelevant to what the author is doing, and to our evaluation of the story. Of course, it keeps us from saying categorically that all short stories are false; but this too is quite irrelevant.

Type
Part VI. Is Scientific Realism Tenable?
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1976 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1976 , 1976 , pp. 335 - 343
Copyright
Copyright © 1977 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

Research for this paper was supported by the Canada Council.

References

[1] Sellars, Wilfrid. “Is Scientific Realism Tenable?” In PSA 1976, Volume Two. Edited by Suppe, F. and Asquith, P.D.. East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1977. Pages 307–334.Google Scholar
[2] Sellars, Wilfrid “Concepts as Involving Laws and Inconceivable Without Them.” Philosophy of Science 15(1948): 287–315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[3] van Fraassen, B. “Wilfrid Sellars on Scientific Realism.” Dialogue 14(1975): 606–616.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[4] van Fraassen, B. “Rejoinder: On a Kantian Conception of Language.” In The Paradox of the Liar. Edited by Martin, R.L.. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. Page 59–66.Google Scholar