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Method and Factual Agreement in Science
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2022
Extract
One important view of the nature of facts in science sees the validity of factual claims as resting upon intersubjective agreement through observation, yet the conditions underlying such intersubjectivity are rarely explored. In this paper I should like to inquire into the role of shared method in arriving at intersubjective agreement concerning fact. One useful way of exploring this issue is to examine the methodological element in factual disputes in science, since such controversy may indicate important aspects of factual agreement.
There are times in science when an appeal to factual evidence is successful in the choice between hypotheses. In fact it is clear that, at least on some occasions, there is agreement among scientists as to “what the facts are.” Moreover, such factual agreement can be found between scientists who maintain quite different theories.
- Type
- Contributed Papers
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- PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1970 , 1970 , pp. 459 - 469
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- Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1970
References
Notes
1 The following passage brings out the idea of intersubjective agreement as the basis of fact in science, and it also shows how intersubjectivity can be taken as ‘given’: “The condition thus imposed upon the observational vocabulary of science is of a pragmatic character: it demands that each term included in that vocabulary be of such a kind that under suitable conditions, different observers can, by means of direct observation, arrive at a high degree of agreement on whether the term applies to a given situation…. That human beings are capable of developing observational vocabularies that satisfy the given requirement is a fortunate circumstance: without it, science as an intersubjective enterprise would be impossible.” (Hempel, C., Aspects of Scientific Explanation, Free Press, N.Y., 1965, p. 127Google Scholar.)
2 A similar strategy for exploring a different condition of intersubjectivity was adopted by Hanson. See his Patterns of Discovery, Cambridge University Press, 1958, p. 18Google Scholar.
3 Achinstein, P., ‘The Problem of Theoretical Terms’, American Philosophical Quarterly 2, 1965Google Scholar.
4 Spector, M., ‘Theory and Observation, I and II’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17, No. 1 and 2Google Scholar.
5 West Churchman, C., Prediction and Optimal Decision, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1961, p. 80Google Scholar, italics in original.
6 Rock, I., “The Role of Repetition in Associative Learning’, American Journal of Psychology 70, 1957CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; see also Rock, I. and Heimer, W. ‘Further Evidence of One Trial Associative Learning’, American Journal of Psychology 72, 1959CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
7 Estes, W. K., ‘Learning Theory and the New “Mental Chemistry’”, The Psychological Review 67, 1960CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
8 Ibid., p. 215.
9 Ibid., p. 221.
10 Estes seems to neglect this possibility and thinks he is at least on the way to experimental designs which are beyond dispute and which will lead directly to the truth about learning theory: “While I would not for a moment deprecate the role of imagination in science, I suspect that it will begin to serve us effectively in learning theory only as we begin to accumulate reliable determinations of the effects of single variables upon single learning trials in individual organisms. If by continual simplification of our experimental analyses and refinement of our mensurational procedures we can achieve these determinations, we may find that the long sought laws of association may be not merely ‘instigated’, or even ‘suggested’, but literally dictated in form by empirical data.” ﹛Ibid., p. 222.)
11 Postman, L., ‘One Trial Learning’, in Verbal Behavior (ed. by Cofer, C. N. and Musgrave, B.), McGraw Hill, N.Y., 1963Google Scholar.
12 Ibid., p. 302.
13 Ibid., p. 303.
14 Ibid., p. 319.
15 G. A. Miller, ‘Comments of Professor Postman’s Paper', on Cofer and Musgrave, op. cit.
16 Ibid., p. 326.
17 For example, see Atkinson, R. C. and Calfe, R. C., ‘Mathematical Learning Theory’, in Scientific Psychology (ed. by Wolman, B. B.), Basic Books, N.Y., 1965Google Scholar.
18 I take this to be an application of Feyerabend's prescription concerning theoretical pluralism. See, for example, his ‘How to Be a Good Empiricist - A Plea for Tolerance in Matters Epistemological’, in Philosophy of Science; The Delaware Seminar, Vol. 2, (ed. by B. Baumrin), Wiley, N.Y., 1963.
19 See my paper ‘Science, Reason and Value’, Theory and Decision, forthcoming.
20 Perry, S. E., The Human Nature of Science, Free Press, N.Y., 1966, p. 236Google Scholar.