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Impartiality and Causal Decision Theory
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 January 2023
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Causal decision theory (CDT) is the best theory of rational choice now available.2 I intend to provide some support for that claim in part I of this paper by responding to two criticisms of CDT. The first criticism says that CDT is superfluous, since it does no better in the problems that matter than does evidential decision theory (EDT) at recommending correct choices. A second criticism says that CDT by itself is flawed: according to this view, there are problems in which CDT makes bad recommendations, unless it is supplemented with an additional deliberation mechanism, either involving metatickles or screening for ratifiable choices.3 I will argue in response to the first criticism that CDT is genuinely better than any EDT of the most sophisticated sort: there are problems where CDT gives better recommendations, and they are problems that do matter.
- Type
- Part X. Causation
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1988
Footnotes
1
I am grateful to the Ohio State University College of Humanities for financial support. In thinking about this paper I have benefited from conversations with Ellery Eells, William Harper, Don Hubin, Paul Humphreys, Richard Jeffrey, George Schumm, and Brian Skyrms.
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