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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2022
In my paper “Aleatory Explanations” (Humphreys 1981a) I presented the rudiments of a theory of explanation which had the following features:
1) Explanations of indeterministic phenomena are given by means of a specification of the contributing and counteracting causes involved;
2) Probability values are not themselves explanatory and explanations need not specify probability values;
3) Maximal specificity criteria are not part of the logical criteria of adequacy for explanations;
4) Partial explanations which are nevertheless true can thus be given;
5) Explanations of this kind show that the traditional ‘X because Y’ pattern of explanation is inadequate for indeterministic causal explanations and must be replaced by ‘X because Y, despite Z’.
In that paper, I restricted myself to explanations of events and their complements, involving only direct causes in two-state Markov chains.