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Thoughts on Legislative Ethics Reform and Representation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
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This article explores the complex and contradictory nature of representative government and its impact on elected officials seeking to balance the public interest with their own private concerns. “Ethics in government” controversies occupy a gray area of public-private overlap which is particularly uncertain today as the press and the public's expectations of acceptable official behavior appear to be changing. Popular pejoratives directed at elected officials include “conflict of interest,” “special interest,” and “undue influence” in contrast to the “public interest.” These terms encompass key representational functions whose precise meaning is unclear.
The uncertainty lies in our inadequate understanding of the nature of representation, that complex interaction between governmental institutions and individual behavior. As Heinz Eulau contends, “… none of the traditional formulations of representation are relevant to the solution of the representational problems which the modern polity faces.” These conceptual limitations hamper our ability to craft “ethics” laws defining appropriate legislative behavior without distorting essential representative functions and responsibilities.
The following discussion explores two contradictory notions of representation: the “trustee” and the “delegate.” Each model inherently favors particular decision-making biases and creates potential conflicts of interest. Important trade-offs are implicit in promoting one model over the other. The analysis also implies that rational and ethical decision-making can result from institutional processes which are designed to check and balance self-interested individual representative behavior.
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- Copyright © The American Political Science Association 1991
References
Notes
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26. Assembly Select Committee on Ethics, April 5, 1989 hearing.
27. Proposition 131 on the California November 1990 ballot was defeated.
28. California Statutes of 1990, Chapter 84. “Financial interest” includes earned income and gifts over $250, investments in real property and business entities of over $1,000, or participation as an employee or director of a business entity (Government Code Section 87103).
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41. September 15, 1989 floor debate in the Assembly on SCA 32 (later Proposition 112 on the June 1990 California ballot).
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47. Los Angeles Times, op. cit.
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