Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gvvz8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-03T14:01:21.120Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Strategic Voting in Plurality Elections: A Simulation of Duverger's Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 April 2009

James W. Endersby  and
Kelly B. Shaw
James W. Endersby
Affiliation:
University of Missouri
Kelly B. Shaw
Affiliation:
Drake University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Experiments designed as an election simulation involve participants in an investigation of strategic voting. Participants assigned political preferences and informed of candidate/party positions on an ideological dimension respond to and learn the results of two public opinion polls before voting. When given two alternatives, the participants vote sincerely. Confronted with three or more alternatives, participants make tactical decisions to narrow the field. Strategic behavior quickly reduces the number of alternatives to two. Consistent with Duverger's law, candidate/party viability encourages strategic voting and the development of a two-party system. The election simulation serves as a useful tool to teach about electoral behavior and to explore topics such as strategic voting.

Type
The Teacher
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 42 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 393 - 399
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alvarez, R. Michael, Boehmke, Frederick J., and Nagler, Jonathan. 2006. “Strategic Voting in British Elections.” Electoral Studies 25 (March): 1–19.10.1016/j.electstud.2005.02.008CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alvarez, R. Michael, and Nagler, Jonathan. 2000. “A New Approach to Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections.” British Journal of Political Science 30 (January): 57–75.10.1017/S000712340000003XCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963. Social Choice and Individual Values. 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Black, Duncan. 1958. Theory of Committees and Elections. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Blais, André, and Nadeau, Richard. 1996. “Measuring Strategic Voting: A Two-Step Procedure.” Electoral Studies 15 (February): 39–52.10.1016/0261-3794(94)00014-XCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blais, André, Young, Robert, and Turcotte, Martin. 2005. “Direct or Indirect? Assessing Two Approaches to the Measurement of Strategic Voting.” Electoral Studies 24 (June): 163–75.10.1016/j.electstud.2004.03.001CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Collier, Kenneth E., McKelvey, Richard D., Ordeshook, Peter C., and Williams, Kenneth C.. 1987. “Retrospective Voting: An Experimental Study.” Public Choice 53 (May): 101–30.10.1007/BF00125844CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, Gary W. 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139174954CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Duverger, Maurice. 1954. Political Parties. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
Endersby, James W. 1993. “Rules of Method and Rules of Conduct: An Experimental Study of Two Types of Procedure and Committee Behavior.” Journal of Politics 55 (February): 218–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Enelow, James, and Hinich, Melvin J.. 1984. The Spatial Theory of Voting. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Evans, Geoffrey. 2002. “On the Validation of Measures of Strategic Motivations: A Critical Comment on Alvarez and Nagler.” British Journal of Political Science 32 (January): 185–88.10.1017/S0007123402220074CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Evans, Geoffrey, and Heath, Anthony. 1993. “A Tactical Error in the Analysis of Tactical Voting.” British Journal of Political Science 23 (January): 131–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Farquharson, Robin. 1969. Theory of Voting. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Fey, Mark. 1997. “Stability and Coordination in Duverger's Law: A Formal Model of Preelection Polls and Strategic Voting.” American Political Science Review 91 (March): 135–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fisher, Steven D. 2004. “Definition and Measurement of Tactical Voting: The Role of Rational Choice.” British Journal of Political Science 34 (January): 152–66.10.1017/S0007123403220391CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Franklin, Mark, Niemi, Richard, and Whitten, Guy. 1994. “The Two Faces of Tactical Voting.” British Journal of Political Science 24 (October): 549–57.10.1017/S0007123400007006CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gibbard, Alan. 1973. “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result.” Econometrica 41 (July): 587–601.10.2307/1914083CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gschwend, Thomas, Johnston, Ron, and Pattie, Charles. 2003. “Split-Ticket Patterns in Mixed-Member Proportional Election Systems.” British Journal of Political Science 33 (January): 109–2710.1017/S000712340300005XCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heath, Anthony, and Evans, Geoffrey. 1994. “Tactical Voting: Concepts, Measurement and Findings.” British Journal of Political Science 24 (October): 557–61.10.1017/S0007123400007018CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hillygus, D. Sunshine. 2007. “The Dynamics of Voter Decision Making Among Minor-Party Supporters.” British Journal of Political Science 37 (April): 225–44.10.1017/S0007123407000117CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lanoue, David, and Bowler, Shaun. 1998. “Party Viability and Voter Behavior.” Social Science Quarterly 79 (June): 361–77.Google Scholar
McKelvey, Richard D., and Ordeshook, Peter C.. 1985a. “Elections with Limited Information: A Fulfilled Expectations Model Using Contemporaneous Poll and Endorsement Data as Information Sources.” Journal of Economic Theory 36 (June): 55–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKelvey, Richard D., and Ordeshook, Peter C.. 1985b. “Sequential Elections with Limited Information.” American Journal of Political Science 29 (August): 480–512.10.2307/2111140CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Merolla, Jennifer L., and Stephenson, Laura B.. 2007. “Strategic Voting in Canada: A Cross-Time Analysis.” Electoral Studies 26 (June): 235–46.10.1016/j.electstud.2006.02.003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Niemi, Richard G., Whitten, Guy, and Franklin, Mark N.. 1992. “Constituency Characteristics, Individual Characteristics and Tactical Voting in the 1987 British General Elections.” British Journal of Political Science 22 (April): 229–40.10.1017/S0007123400006347CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Niemi, Richard G., Whitten, Guy, and Franklin, Mark N.. 1993. “People Who Live in Glass Houses.” British Journal of Political Science 23 (October): 549–53.10.1017/S0007123400006724CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rabinowitz, George, and Macdonald, Stuart Elaine. 1989. “A Directional Theory of Issue Voting.” American Political Science Review 83 (March): 93–121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rae, Douglas. 1971. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. Rev. ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Riker, William H. 1982. “The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science.” American Political Science Review 76 (December): 753–66.10.2307/1962968CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Satterthwaite, Mark A. 1975. “Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions.” Journal of Economic Theory 10 (April): 187–217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tavits, Margit, and Annus, Taavi. 2006. “Learning to Make Votes Count: The Role of Democratic Experience.” Electoral Studies 25 (March): 72–90.10.1016/j.electstud.2005.02.003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, Gordon. 1975. “The Paradox of Not Voting for Oneself.” American Political Science Review 69 (September): 919.10.2307/1958404CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, Kenneth C. 1994. “Spatial Elections with Endorsements and Uninformed Voters: Some Laboratory Experiments.” Public Choice 80 (July): 1–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar