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Strategic Voting and the Role of Polls: Evidence from an Embedded Web Survey

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 April 2015

Timothy S. Rich
Timothy S. Rich*
Affiliation:
Western Kentucky University
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Abstract

What motivates people to vote strategically? Although a broad literature addresses this question, few studies capture the point at which individuals shift from sincere to strategic voters. Furthermore, the influence of polling information remains debated. The analysis in this article tackles strategic voting with an original embedded experiment in a web survey. Empirical analysis finds that respondents who were told of the margin of error in preelection polls were more likely to vote strategically. This analysis also suggests the limits to strategic voting even in ideal settings.

Type
Features
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 48 , Issue 2 , April 2015 , pp. 301 - 305
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2015 

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