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Presidential Prerogative Power: The Case of the Bush Administration and Legislative Power

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Robert J. Spitzer
Robert J. Spitzer*
Affiliation:
State University of New York at Cortland
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Extract

Both the campaign and early administration of George Bush trumpeted a theme of a more centrist, lower-volume, less confrontational approach to politics and governing. Aspects of both the campaign and the administration seemed to belie this pledge, from the Willie Horton ads to the fight over the Tower nomination and the invasion of Panama. Still, the prevailing tone and style of the Bush administration during its first year seemed far less strident than that of the Reagan era. As Edwards (1989, 3) noted, “Bush has worked diligently to create an atmosphere of reconciliation and goodwill” and has sought to avoid “politically-charged polemics.”

Yet in another respect, the Bush administration seems to have abandoned any semblance of a “kinder, gentler” politics in its dealings with Congress. Three seemingly minor aspects of Bush's recent dealings with Congress pertaining to legislative powers suggest, if anything, a singularly aggressive effort to extend the bounds of the presidency by what I will argue is a suspect invocation of prerogative powers. The actions described below have received virtually no press attention; yet they may presage a new era of presidential expansionism exceeding that which we have witnessed to date.

Type
Research Article
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 24 , Issue 1 , March 1991 , pp. 38 - 42
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association 1991

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