Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-r5fsc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-25T22:38:54.507Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Political Science and Fundamental Research

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Michael C. Munger
Michael C. Munger*
Affiliation:
Duke University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
The Public Value of Political Research
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 33 , Special Issue 1: The Public Value of Political Science Research , March 2000 , pp. 25 - 32
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association 2000

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alvarez, Michael. 1997. Information and Elections. 1st ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aristotle. 1979. Politics and Poetics. Trans. Jowett, B. and Butcher, S.H.. Norwalk, CT: Easton Press.Google Scholar
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963. Social Choice and Individual Values. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Austen-Smith, David. 1990. “Information Transmission in Debate.” American Journal of Political Science 34(February): 124–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Austen-Smith, David, and Banks, Jeffrey. 1996. “Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem.” American Political Science Review 90(March): 34–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Axelrod, Robert, and Keohane, Robert. 1986. “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions.” In Cooperation under Anarchy, ed. Oye, Kenneth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Banks, Jeffrey. 1991. Signaling Games in Political Science. Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishing.Google Scholar
Black, Duncan. 1958. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Brams, Steven J., and Taylor, Alan D.. 1996. Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brams, Steven J., and Taylor, Alan D.. 1999. The Win-Win solution: Guaranteeing Fair Shares to Everybody. New York: W.W. Norton.Google Scholar
Brennan, Geoffrey, and Buchanan, James M.. 1985. The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Buchanan, James M. 1954. “Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets.” Journal of Political Economy 62: 114–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, James M. 1962. “The Relevance of Pareto Optimality.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 3: 341–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, James M. 1966. “An Individualistic Theory of Political Process.” In Varieties of Political Theory, ed. Easton, David. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
Buchanan, James M. 1975a. The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Buchanan, James M. 1975b. “A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory.” American Economic Review 65: 225–30.Google Scholar
Buchanan, James M., and Tullock, Gordon. 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Brennan, Geoffrey, and Buchanan, James M.. 1985. The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Calvert, Randall. 1985. “The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice.” American Journal of Political Science 37(August): 799–833.Google Scholar
Coleman, James, and Ferejohn, John. 1986. “Democracy and Social Choice.” Ethics 97:6–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Converse, Phillip. 1964. “The Nature of Mass Belief Systems.” In Ideology and Its Discontents, ed. Apter, David. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.Google Scholar
Grofman, Bernard, and Feld, Scott. 1988. “Rousseau's General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective.” American Political Science Review 82(June): 567–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heiner, Ronald. 1983. “On the Origins of Predictable Behavior.” American Economic Review 73:560–95.Google Scholar
Hinich, Melvin, and Munger, Michael. 1994. Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Iyengar, Shanto. 1991. Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jones, Bryan. 1995. Reconceiving Democratic Decision-Making. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Kettl, Donald. 1997. “The Global Revolution in Public Management: Driving Themes, Missing Links.” Journal of Policy Management and Management 16(Summer): 446–62.Google Scholar
Ladha, Krishna. 1992. “The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes.” American Journal of Political Science 36(August): 617–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ladha, Krishna. 1996. “Hypothesis Testing and the Jury Theorem.” In Collective Decision Making: Social Choice and Political Economy, ed. Schofield, Norman. Boston: Kluwer Academic.Google Scholar
Ladha, Krishna, and Miller, Gary. 1996. “Political Discourse, Factions, and the General Will: Correlated Voting and Condorcet's Jury Theorem.” In Collective Decision Making: Social Choice and Political Economy, ed. Schofield, Norman. Boston: Kluwer Academic.Google Scholar
Lodge, Milton, Steenbergen, Marco, and Brau, Shawn. 1995. “The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation.” American Political Science Review 89(June): 309–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lupia, Arthur. 1994. “Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections.” American Political Science Review 88(March): 63–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lupia, Arthur, and McCubbins, Mathew. 1998. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
McKelvey, Richard, and Ordeshook, Peter. 1986. “Information, Electoral Equilibria, and the Democratic Ideal.” Journal of Politics 8:909–937.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Monroe, Burt. 1995. “Fully Proportional Representation.” American Political Science Review 89(December): 925–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Munger, Michael. 2000. “Five Questions: An Integrated Agenda for Public Choice.” Public Choice (in press).Google Scholar
North, Douglass. 1982. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.Google Scholar
North, Douglass. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riker, William. 1982. Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. San Francisco: Freeman.Google Scholar
Schofield, Norman. 1985. “Anarchy, Altruism, and Cooperation: A Review.” Social Choice and Welfare 2(2): 207–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, Adam. [1759] 1991. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, Adam. [1776]1994. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. New York: Modern Library.Google Scholar
Tullock, Gordon. 1967. “The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 81: 256–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Young, H. Peyton, 1994. Equity: In Theory and Practice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Public Opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar