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Political Science and Fundamental Research
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
Abstract
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- Type
- The Public Value of Political Research
- Information
- PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 33 , Special Issue 1: The Public Value of Political Science Research , March 2000 , pp. 25 - 32
- Copyright
- Copyright © The American Political Science Association 2000
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