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The Patriot Act's Institutional Story: More Evidence of Congressional Ambivalence
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 January 2007
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In the first year after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress agreed with President George W. Bush and his administration that the key to national security at home and abroad was enhancing executive branch power. To this end, leaders smoothed the legislative process and members largely consented to the new policies and rapid review pace. By December 2002, Congress passed two major domestic laws related to the new War on Terrorism and two war resolutions. But beginning in 2003, many members, largely but not all Democrats, renewed their interest in legislative powers and prerogatives by mounting small rebellions against these once-popular policies, especially the Iraq War and the Patriot Act. Committees and the chamber floors re-emerged as arenas for heated debate on policy oversight, funding, and implementation and management. While members critical of the war have had a hard time gaining traction to alter the nation's course in Iraq, there was a golden opportunity to recalibrate power and policy on the Patriot Act as 16 of its most controversial provisions were scheduled to sunset in 2005. Although the Patriot Act's second legislative round was far more complex than the first, the result gave even more power to the executive branch. Congress's ambition subsided, again.My thanks to the College of Arts and Sciences, University of Louisville, for funding related to this project. A version of this paper was presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association and I thank the discussant, Lilly Goren, for her comments and suggestions, as well as the anonymous reviewers for PS.
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- © 2007 The American Political Science Association
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