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Income, Preferences, and the Dynamics of Policy Responsiveness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 2008

Joseph Daniel Ura  and
Christopher R. Ellis
Joseph Daniel Ura
Affiliation:
Texas A&M University
Christopher R. Ellis
Affiliation:
North Carolina State University
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Extract

A variety of measures indicate that income inequality has grown significantly in the United States during the last three decades (APSA 2004; Brandolini and Smeeding 2006). In a flurry of recent research, scholars have attributed this trend to the failure of the national government to represent the preferences of ordinary citizens in general and less wealthy citizens in particular (APSA 2004; Bartels 2004; 2006; Gilens 2005), who participate in politics less consistently and contribute fewer resources to political candidates than their wealthier peers (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). The American Political Science Association's (APSA) Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy summarizes this representative failure hypothesis: “disparities in participation ensure that ordinary Americans speak in a whisper while the most advantaged roar” (2004, 2).

Type
Features
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 41 , Issue 4 , October 2008 , pp. 785 - 794
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association 2008

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