Kim Quaile Hill (PS: Political Science and Politics, July 2004) makes a somewhat nuanced contribution to the appraisal of epistemic controversies in the discipline of political science. His primary concern is for the manner in which erroneous presumptions about the nature of the scientific method in fields such as chemistry or physics have encumbered the effort to instill students with the habit of applying similar approaches in the study of politics. At first, the argument seems directed at uninformed students who do not recognize the social sciences as legitimately “scientific.” Upon further reading, it quickly becomes clear in her elaboration of five common “myths” about science that the more implicit intention of this piece is to challenge the assertion of some in the field that the abstract, variant qualities of political phenomena make these applications somehow inappropriate. The point that he proffers—that the physical sciences are hardly as rigid, finite or objective as some may assume—is certainly a valid one.