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How Congress Does the Difficult

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Sidney Waldman*
Affiliation:
Haverford College

Extract

Legislators in democratic countries find it relatively easy to do certain things. For example, they typically have little problem reducing taxes or increasing benefits for a majority of citizens. However, should they attempt to raise taxes or cut benefits for the majority, they will probably encounter opposition, even if taking such measures is necessary for the public good. How members of democratically elected legislatures manage to accomplish unpopular and politically difficult tasks is worth examining. In this article, I illustrate how members of the U.S. Congress have “done the difficult”–i.e., passed laws or instituted programs, often in the public interest, that were unpopular with the voters or would have been were they known to the public–and consider why the legislators were able to take the actions they did.

Determining how members of Congress make unpopular but necessary policy decisions is difficult because members themselves will not emphasize when they deviate from the public's will and how they are able to do so. After all, most of them are more interested in getting reelected than in being perceived as courageous and resourceful statesmen. Even the most civic-minded legislator may avoid calling attention to unpopular votes after realizing cynical and skeptical voters are unlikely to reward him for making difficult choices in the public's interest. Consequently, to reduce the likelihood that the action will be highlighted, unpopular legislation is often enacted in obscure and technical ways.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association 2000

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